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First icial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2015-0003329 Current Judge: Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Linda Dunn vs. Idaho State Tax Commission 
Linda Dunn vs. Idaho State Tax Commission 
Date Code User 
5/11/2015 ADMR LEU Administrative assignment of Judge 
LEU Filing: L3 - Appeal or petition for judicial review 
or cross appeal or cross-petition from 
commission, board, or body to district court 
User: LEU 
Judge 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Benjamin R. Simpson 
Paid by: Kochansky, Richard William (attorney for 
Dunn, Linda) Receipt number: 0018382 Dated: 
5/11/2015 Amount: $221.00 (Cash) For: Dunn, 
Linda (plaintiff) 
PETN DEGLMAN Petition For Review of Idaho State Tax Benjamin R. Simpson 
Comission Decision of April 17, 2015, Appeal No. 
14- B -1450 
5/20/2015 MISC HUFFMAN Statement of Issues Benjamin R. Simpson 
5/22/2015 SUMI MITCHELL Summons Issued - L.W. Benjamin R. Simpson 
5/29/2015 ADMR VIGIL Administrative assignment of Judge (batch 
process) 
6/12/2015 AFSV MMILLER Affidavit Of Service - 5/27/15 BK obo ISTC Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
6/15/2015 NOTE MMILLER Clerk's Notation - Sent To Judge For Review Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
6/16/2015 WOOSLEY Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Idaho 
State Tax Commission (defendant) Receipt 
number: 0022976 Dated: 6/16/2015 Amount: 
$.00 (Cash) For: Idaho State Tax Commission 
(defendant) 
ANSW WOOSLEY Answer Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
6/18/2015 HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
08/04/2015 03:00 PM) 
6/19/2015 NOHG LARSEN Notice Of Hearing Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
ORDR LARSEN Scheduling Order And Forms Issued Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
6/29/2015 RSCN DIXON Scheduling Form-Richard Kockansky Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
7/2/2015 CERT WOOSLEY Certificate of Service Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
MISC HUFFMAN Scheduling Form - David B Young Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
7/9/2015 LARSEN Notice Vacating Hearing Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
HRVC LARSEN Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
on 08/04/2015 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
02/11/2016 08:00 AM) 
HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
03/21/2016 09:00 AM) 3 day trial 
NOHG LARSEN Notice Of Pre-Trial Conference And Trial Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
ORDR LARSEN Order For Mediation Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
NOTC LARSEN Trial Notice Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
PTOR LARSEN Scheduling Order, Notice Of Trial Setting And Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Initial Pre-Trial Order 
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Linda Dunn vs. Idaho State Tax Commission 
Linda Dunn vs. Idaho State Tax Commission 
Date Code User Judge 
7/13/2015 MOTN MITCHELL Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
7/24/2015 ORDR MITCHELL Order Granting Admission Pro Hae Vice Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
1/4/2016 CONT LARSEN Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
scheduled on 02/11/2016 08:00 AM: Continued 
CONT LARSEN Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
scheduled on 03/21/2016 09:00 AM: Continued 
3 day trial 
HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
07/14/2016 08:00 AM) 
HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
08/15/2016 09:00 AM) 3 day trial 
LARSEN Amended Notice of Pretrial Conference/Trial Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
NOTC LARSEN Trial Notice Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
1/28/2016 STIP DIXON Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
2/2/2016 HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Judgment 05/03/2016 03:00 PM) Young-1 hour 
2/22/2016 STIP DIXON Joint Stipulation Of Facts Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
3/29/2016 HRVC LARSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
scheduled on 05/03/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated per Young- Young-1 hour 
BRIE KOZMA Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
4/1/2016 BRIE KOZMA Defendant's Opening Brief Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
4/20/2016 BRIE KOZMA Reply Brief of Appellant Linda Dunn Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
4/22/2016 BRIE LARSEN Defendant's Reply Brief Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
6/8/2016 ORDR LARSEN Memorandum Decision And Order On Plaintiff's Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Petition For Review 
7/12/2016 APSC WOOSLEY Appealed To The Supreme Court Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
WOOSLEY Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Kovacevich, Pro 
Hae Vice CV 15-3329 ONLY, Robert E (attorney 
for Dunn, Linda) Receipt number: 0028147 
Dated: 7/12/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: 
Dunn, Linda (plaintiff) 
BNDC WOOSLEY Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 28148 Dated Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
7/12/2016 for 100.00) 
7/14/2016 INHD LARSEN Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
scheduled on 07/14/2016 08:00 AM: Interim 
Hearing Held 
DCHH LARSEN District Court Hearing Held Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 pages 
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Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
scheduled on 08/15/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 3 day trial 
Remittitur (entered in error) 
Order Vacating Remittitur 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Return Certificate-Idaho Supreme Court 7/28/16 Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho State Tax Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Commission, Defendant; Dunn, Linda, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 8/3/2016 
Judgment 
Case status changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 1496 
dated 8/23/2016 amount 100.00) 
Case status changed: closed 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 35072 Dated 
8/31/2016 for 8.55) 
Case status changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 1542 
dated 8/31/2016 amount 8.55) 
Case status changed: closed 
Request For Additional Documents For The 
Record 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 




























RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY 
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
(208) 667-4595 ISB #2435 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LINDA DUNN, individually and as 
















) ___________ ) 
No. (:V \.:>· 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF 
IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION DECISION OF 
APRIL 17, 2015, APPEAL NO. 
14-B-1450 
Appellant, Linda Dunn, individually and as surviving spouse of Barry Dun(' 
who died on October 26, 2012, pursuant to I.C. § 63-3812, petitions this Court 
for judicial review of the decision issued by the Respondent Idaho State Tax 
Commission on April 17, 2015, entering a tax deficiency and tax penalties against 
Appellant. The matter was heard on October 15, 2014, at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
before Hearing Officer Cindy Pollack. The recording is in her possession. A copy 
of the final decision and order is attached to this petition as Exhibit A. 
2 8 Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax 
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 1 
Assigned to 






























The tax years involved in this proceeding are December 31, 2000, 2001 1 
2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009 and 2010. Appellant has paid all the tax assessed 
by Respondent. No probate proceedings have been commenced in any state. The 
Respondent has admitted that Barry Dunn, deceased husband of Linda Dunn, the 
Petitioner, was never a resident of the state of Idaho at any time during the years 
involved. The Respondent also admits that all the income on which the state of 
Idaho assessed Idaho income tax, was on the income earned by Barry Dunn's 
personal effort when physically present in Alaska, Washington or Texas. None of 
Barry Dunn's employers, during the time involved, had an office or any activity in 
the state ofldaho that would give any employer a tax nexus in Idaho. Dunn never 
worked in Idaho. He moved from Alaska where he was a resident to Texas where 
he established residency. Barry Dunn was a project manager and worked on the 
Lindelhoven and other oil fields. He lived where he worked. He obtained driver's 
licenses, voted, paid state income and sales taxes in the states where he was 
employed. Linda Dunn, during some of the times involved, was present in Idaho, 
but never took any action that would change her residency to Idaho. 
Barry Dunn changed his residency from Alaska to Texas. The residency of 
Linda Dunn, for purposes of determining whether any of her husband's income 
derived from his personal labor, remains at his state of residency which is Texas. 
Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax 
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 2 









Texas law, Family Code § 3.102(1), provides that the sole manager of income 
earned by labor of the spouse is managed separately by the spouse whose labor 
earned the income. Linda Dunn did not earn any of the income that is taxed by 
the state of Idaho in this case. It was all earned by the toil, talent and personal 
effort of Barry Dunn in the state of Texas. The residence of Barry Dunn controls 
the character of income he earned in Texas. The personal income earned by him 




















management and control of the wages under Texas law, the place where he earned 
it. Idaho community property law cannot transmute Barry Dunn's income to 
Linda Dunn. 
The state of Idaho offered no governmental benefit to Barry Dunn. The 
community property laws of the state of Idaho do not apply to a Texas resident, 
who earned the income while physically present in Texas. Blangers v. Idaho 
Deparlment of Revenue, 114 Idaho 944, 963 P.2d 1052 (1980) applies. Barry 
Dunn "did not owe his livelihood" to Idaho. Idaho did not give Barry Dunn 
anything that it can ask in return. Appellant never agreed that Idaho law applied. 
No probate has been commenced in any state. Barry Dunn had no property in 
Idaho. I.C. § 63-3029 recognizes the issue of out of state credit to income taxes 
charged by other states. Texas has no income tax. 
Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax 
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 3 





























The state of Idaho has no nexus to apply its income tax law to a non 
resident of Idaho, on personal income earned in another state where the non 
resident resides and is physically present in that state. Barry Dunn had to be 
physically present in Texas in order to earn the income. The U.S. Const. art. 4, 
§ 2, places each state upon equal footing with citizens of other states. This right 
secured by the privileges and immunities clause applies to income tax imposed by 
states. One of the rights secured by the privileges and immunities clause is that 
a citizen is not subject to pay a greater amount of income tax than a citizen who 
earns income in another state. The state of Idaho taxed Petitioner Linda Dunn on 
personal income earned by her husband, Barry Dunn, a citizen of Texas where his 
personal services earned the income. No Texas income tax is levied on Barry 
Dunn's wages by the state of Texas. The privileges and immunities clause applies. 
The state of Idaho, who has no nexus to apply its income tax, cannot exact a 
greater amount than Texas. See e.g. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 
522 U.S. 287, 118 S. Ct. 766, 139 L.Ed 2d 717 (1998). The Dormant Interstate 
Commerce Act requires equal treatment. I.C. § 63-3026A taxes non residents on 
income " ... derived from or related to sources within Idaho". Income earned by 
Barry Dunn's personal effort in Texas is not related in any way to Idaho. 
Blangers, supra at 948 states that: "there be a sufficient nexus between the 
presence, property or activities of the non resident and the state attempting to 
Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax 
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 4 





























impose the tax in order to survive a challenge under the due process clause or the 
commerce clause." Therefore, the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is violated. There is no presence, property. or activity within Idaho 
to tax wages earned in Texas by Barry Dunn. 
The state of Idaho also failed to recognize that Barry Dunn had a right to 
rely on his tax preparer on an issue of first impression. The application of tax 
penalties failed to recognize that reasonable care was taken in the preparation of 
the returns. 
In issuing its decision, the Commission erred in taxing the income earned 
by Barry Dunn while a resident of Texas and domiciled in that state. A transcript 
of the hearing is not requested. A separate statement of issues will be filed within 
14 days. The entire deficiency is based on the income earned in Texas. The 
decision, including penalties, is erroneous, capricious, illegal and without 
justification of either facts or law. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays for judgment against Respondent as follows: 
1. For a determination that Respondent erred in assessing any tax or 
penalties against Appellant and that the decision is without any factual or legal 
basis; it is erroneous, arbitrary and capricious without any factual or legal 
foundation. 
2. That the final order and decision be reversed. 
Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax 
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 5 
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2 3. That all amounts paid to the Respondent for the years indicated be 


























4. That all amounts paid as penalties be refunded as no penalties apply. 
5. For such other and further relief as to this Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED this 1L day of May, 2015. 
Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax 
Commission Decision of April 1 7, 2015 - 6 





























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Richard W. Kochansky, hereby certify that a copy of this Petition has been 
sent to Alan R. Pack, Respondent's Representative, by First Class Mail to: 
Mr. Alan R. Pack 
Tax Policy Specialist 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
800 Park Blvd., Plaza IV 
Boise, ID 83712-7742 
DATED this // day of May, 2015. 
Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax 
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 7 
Attorney for Appellant 
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BEFORE THE IDAHO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 
RECEIVED 















R.E. KOVACEVICH, P.LL.C. 
V. 
APPEAL NO. 14-8-1450 
FINAL DECISION 
AND ORDER 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
INCOME TAX APPEAL 
This appeal is taken from an Idaho State Tax Commission (STC) decision 
issued June 6, 2014 on Docket No. 25096. The agency decision affirmed a 
Notice of Deficiency Determination dated April 13, 2012. The appeal 
concerns taxable years 2000, 2001, 2003 thru 2005, and 2007 thru 2010. 
This matter came on for hearing October 15, 2014 in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
before Hearing Officer Cindy Pollock. Attorneys Richard Kochansky and 
Robert Kovacevich represented Appellant at hearing. Alan Pack represented 
Respondent STC:· 
Board Members David Kinghorn, Linda Pike and Leland Heinrich participated 
in this decision. 
The issue on appeal is the proper tax treatment of income earned by a 
spouse domiciled in a different community property state. 
The decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission is affirmed. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
For the taxable years 2000, 2001, 2003 through 2005, and 2007 through 2010, 
Appellant was married, and Appellant's husband (Husband) was a resident of Texas and 
Washington and earned Texas and Washington source income. Appellant filed some part-
year income tax returns in Idaho and also earned income sourced in Idaho for some of the 
-1-
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years in question. During its review, Respondent determined in addition to Appellant's 
income, one-half(½) of Husband's income should have been included as taxable income 
for the years concerning this appeal. Appellant contested the tax treatment of Husband's 
income. 
Appellant argued the major substantive issue in this case concerns the wages 
earned by Husband while he was in the state of Texas during the relevant tax years on 
appeal. Citing McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 Tex. 187 (1849), Appellant contended Husband was 
not a resident of Idaho and the states in which he lived controls ownership. It was 
contended, according to law, Husband's residency prevails on his Texas wages. The main 
point of contention was the domicile of husband "automatically becomes the domicile of 
wife." Further, Appellant indicated neither spouse was a resident of Idaho on Husband's 
Texas wages under the "residence by operation of law" principle. Several points of 
contention of residency, non-residency and part-time residency were raised. 
Husband passed away in 2012. Appellant argued the State Tax Commission, nor 
the Board of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter until Husband's probate is 
commenced. Federal statutes and the Constitution were cited in this regard. Respondent 
countered Husband was not a resident of Idaho during the years in question and the tax 
deficiency does not concern Husband, but rather only Appellant (Wife). 
Lastly, Appellant maintained if taxes were owed, there was authority in which 
penalties would be avoided as Appellant "acted in good faith and reasonable cause on 
income not earned in Idaho." Respondent claimed Idaho Code Section 63-3046 dictates 
-2-
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when penalties are assessed. 
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Appeal No. 14-8-1450 
Respondent explained Appellant filed Idaho part-year/nonresident income tax 
returns for the taxable years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. On the returns, Appellant's 
losses, capital gains and/or losses, interest and dividend income were reported. On the 
2010 return some Idaho wages were also reported. In examining the 2007 through 2010 
returns, Respondent determined Appellant was a resident of Idaho in the years before this 
period. On closer review, Respondent found no Idaho individual income tax returns had 
been filed after taxable year 1999 and before 2006. Therefore, the taxable years 2000 
through 2005 were examined. In the audit findings, it was reported the only time Appellant 
changed residency from Idaho was when Appellant resided in Alaska for the full-year in 
2002. Respondent found no issues with Appellant's returns for taxable years 2002 and 
2006, thereby excluding these two (2) years from the deficiency determination. 
Respondent explained information and documentation provided by Appellant 
necessitated the need for Idaho returns for tax years 2000, 2001, and 2003 through 2005. 
The documentation was in the form of a completed Idaho State Tax Commission 
Residency/Domicile Questionnaire for taxable years 2007-2009. Appellant answered a 
home was being occupied in Idaho, nothing was done to change status from resident of 
Idaho to a nonresident of Idaho, a business was operated in Idaho, and 365 days per year 
were spent in Idaho during 2007 thru 2009. Appellant also indicated on the form she was 
registered to vote in Idaho and personal vehicles were registered in Idaho. Further 
documentation was provided in the way of two (2) Homeowner's Exemption Applications. 
-3-
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The first was dated in 1991 and signed by Appellant declaring the Idaho residence was 
being occupied by owner. Appellant sold this property in 2006 and purchased another in 
2008. The second Application was dated in 2008 and again Appellant stated the residence 
was owner-occupied. Also on the later application, Appellant declared she was a full-year 
resident, had an Idaho Driver's license, and cars were registered in Idaho. 
In addition to the non-filed returns, Appellant's income was found by Respondent 
to be improperly reported for taxable years 2007 through 2010. Adjustments to Appellant's 
returns were made and included in the Notice of Deficiency Determination. Respondent 
contended after multiple correspondence efforts with Appellant, the only issue remaining 
was the determination and allocation of the community property income. Respondent 
explained, as a resident of Idaho, Appellant was required to report all income derived from 
any source for purposes of determining her Idaho income tax liability. As such, 
Respondent found half of Husband's income was attributable to Appellant as taxable 
income by way of Idaho being a community property state. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This Board's goal in its hearings and other proceedings is the acquisition of 
sufficient, accurate evidence to support a final determination of a fair and just tax 
assessment. This Board, giving full opportunity for all arguments and having considered 
all testimony and documentary evidence submitted by the parties in support of their 
respective positions, hereby enters the following conclusions. 
There are several issues before the Board in this case. Each which will be 
-4-
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addressed separately. The first question concerns Appellant's residency for each of the 
tax years relevant to this case. Appellant stated she did not reside in Idaho some of the 
years in question. However, the associated testimony was vague and it was unclear which 
years Appellant was declaring to be a resident, part-year resident, or nonresident of Idaho. 
Respondent maintained Idaho was Appellant's residency or part-time residency 
state for the years in question. From record we find Appellant owned and occupied two (2) 
residences in Idaho and received the homeowner's exemption on such properties. 
Appellant operated an Idaho business for some of the years in question. Further, on the 
Idaho STC Residency/Domicile Questionnaire, Appellant declared her vehicles were 
registered in Idaho, she was registered to vote in Idaho, and maintained an Idaho drivers 
license. For tax years 2007 through 2009 Appellant declared she lived in Idaho 365 days 
each year. Appellant was receiving the homeowners exemption on her residence for all 
the years under appeal. Further, for some of the years, Appellant filed part-
year/nonresident returns. The evidence leads the Board to conclude Appellant was shown 
to be a resident of Idaho for some years and a part-year resident for others. 
Idaho Code § 63-3002 calls for levying taxes on the taxable income from all 
sources, "wherever derived", of all Idaho residents. In this case, Appellant was a resident 
of Idaho in the relevant years asserted. As such all Appellant's income is considered 
taxable, unless expressly exempted, which is not the case here. 
A different tax treatment of Husband's income was Appellant's main contention. 
There is no dispute Appellant and Husband were married during the tax years in question. 
-5-
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Appellant and Husband chose the filing status of "married filing jointly'' and filed tax returns 
accordingly. Idaho is a community property state and as a community property state, it is 
presumed all property acquired by either spouse after marriage is community property, to 
which each spouse has an undivided one-half interest. 
Idaho Code § 32-906 provides in pertinent part, 
[t]he income, including all the rents, issues and profits, of all property, 
separate or community, is community property unless the conveyance by 
which it is acquired provides or both spouses, by written agreement 
specifically so providing, declare that all or specifically designated property 
and the income . . . be the separate property of the spouse to whom the 
property belongs. 
Husband's income was acquired after his marriage to Appellant. Nothing in the 
record indicates there was any written agreement between Appellant and Husband to treat 
Husband's income as his separate property. The income is therefore presumed 
community property, to which Appellant owns a one-half interest. As a result, Appellant's 
one-half interest in Husband's income is attributable to Appellant's taxable income under 
the relevant provisions of the Idaho Tax Code. 
The Board disagrees with Appellant's assertion that Appellant's community property 
interest remains with the state in which Husband is domiciled. Washington and Texas are 
community property states like Idaho and therefore the income is equally attributable to 
each spouse. We find one-half(½ ) of Husband's income is attributable to Appellant and 
should be treated as such on her Idaho income tax returns. 
Appellant maintained if taxes were determined to be owed, interest and penalties 
should not apply. Respondent maintained there was no good basis for waiving the 
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penalties and interest. 
Idaho Code Section 63-3046. Penalties and additions to the tax in case of 
deficiency. (a) If any part of any deficiency is due to negligence or disregard 
of rules but without intent to defraud, five percent (5%) of the total amount 
of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be assessed, collected 
and paid in the same manner as if it were a deficiency. 
(c) (1) In the event the return required by this chapter is not filed on or before 
the due date (including extensions) of the return, there may be collected a 
penalty of five percent (5%) of the tax due on such returns for each month 
elapsing after the due date (including extensions) of such returns until the 
return is filed. 
(g) Total penalties imposed under subsections (a), (c) and (d) of this section 
and undersection_63-3033, Idaho Code, shall not exceed twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the tax due on the return. 
The Board does not find where the State Tax Commission must abate penalty and 
interest. We understand the STC may impose penalty and interest as reflected in Idaho 
Code above. We have not identified any special facts or authority on which this Board 
should overturn the decision of the STC. Therefore we deny taxpayer's request for 
abatement of penalties and interest. 
For the years at issue, the Board concludes Appellant must report all income from 
Idaho sources, as well as one-half (½) of the amount of Appellant's community property 
interest in Husband's out-of-state wages. For the reasons expressed above, the Board 
affirms the conclusions and findings in the decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission. 
FINAL ORDER 
In accordance with the foregoing Final Decision, IT IS ORDERED that the decision 
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of the Idaho State Tax Commission be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
DATED this 17th day of April, 2015. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL PRIVILEGES 
Enclosed is a Final Decision and Order of the Idaho State Board of Tax Appeals 
concerning an appeal. 
Motion for reconsideration of the hearing record or motion for rehearing the appeal 
(with good cause detailed) may be made by filing such motion with the Clerk of the Board 
within ten (10) days of mailing of the Final Decision and Order, with a copy of the motion 
being sent to all other parties to the proceeding before the Board. 
According to Idaho Code§ 63-3812, either party can appeal to the district court from 
this decision. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 63-3812, the appeal shall be taken and perfected 
in accordance with Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
cp 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of April, 2015, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing FINAL DECISION AND ORDER by the method indicated below and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Richard W. Kochansky 
408 E. Sherman Ave., #309 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Robert Kovacevich 
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 525 
Spokane, WA 92201-0995 
Alan Pack 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, ID 83722 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission 
5"I U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile 
D STATEHOUSE MAIL 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile 
D STATEHOUSE MAIL 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile 
fil STATEHOUSE MAIL 
Ronna Bell 
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408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LINDA DUNN, individually and as 
















) ___________ ) 
No. CV15-3329 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Now comes Appellant, Linda Dunn, and sets forth the following issues: 
1. Can the state of Idaho tax Linda Dunn on one half of the wages her 
husband, Barry Dunn, earned while a resident of Texas and who was physically 
present in Texas when he earned the salary. 
2. Does Idaho community property law apply to salary of a Texas 






3. Does Texas law, Texas Family Code § 3.102(a)(l) (Vernon's Texas 
Statutes and Code annotated Title 1, Subtitle B, Subchapter C), providing for 
management and control of earnings to the earner as if he were single and 
Statement of Issues - 1 

























specifically rejecting joint control prevent any attribution of the earnings to Linda 
Dunn. 
4. Does the case of Valdez v. Rameriz, 574 S.W. 2d 748 (Texas 1978) 
holding that sole management of earnings also preempted the non earing Spouse's 
disposition of the income, require a decision in favor of Linda Dunn? 
5. Can wages earned by the husband and controlled by the husband 
under the law of the state where earned be presumed to be the wife's property or 
does actual receipt need be proved from husband earner to wife. 
6. Are wages earned by non resident husband in Texas not derived from 
or related to sources within Idaho and therefore not subject to Idaho income tax 
pursuant to I.C. § 63-3026A. 
7. Do wages earned in Texas by a resident of Texas while domiciled in 
Texas have a taxable nexus in Idaho? If not, is lack of nexus a violation of due 
process and the commerce clause preventing Idaho income? 
8. 
9. 
Was Linda Dunn an Idaho resident? 
For purposes of imputation of wages earned by the husband while a 
resident of another state, does the residency of the husband become the residency 
of the wife. 
10. What did Idaho give in return to Barry Dunn to tax wages he earned 
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11. Can Idaho community property law preempt Texas community 
property law on the issue of management and control of a Texas resident's wages 
earned in Texas? 
12. Is the reciprocal credit statute in Idaho LC.§ 63-3029 a violation of 
the U.S. Constitution Art. 4, § 2, the privileges and immunities equal burden 
provision? 
13. Does the case of Lunding v. New York Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 
118 S.Ct. 766, 139 L. Ed 2d 717 (1998) applying the equal footing privileges and 
immunities constitutional provision apply to this case? 
14. In any event should penalties in this case be denied as the issue was 
novel and first impression? 
15. Should the tax assessment be reversed? 
DATED this iLJ_ day of May, 2015. 
~+--------
RICHARD W. KdCHANSKY, ISB #2435 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Richard W. Kochansky, hereby certify that a copy of this Statement of 
Issues has been sent to Alan R. Pack, Respondent's Representative, by First Class 
Mail to: 
Mr. Alan R. Pack 
Tax Policy Specialist 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
800 Park Blvd., Plaza IV 
Boise, ID 83712-7742 
DATED this ~ 6 day of May, 2015. 
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CASE NO. CV-15-3329 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW the Idaho State Tax Commission (Tax Commission), by and through its 
attorney, David B. Young, Deputy Attorney General, and answers the Plaintiffs Petition fol' 
Review (Complaint). 
I. 
STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
This Action Should Proceed as an Original De Novo Bench Trial under Idaho Code § 6J-
3049. This Action Should Not Proceed as a Petfdon for .ludtclaJ Review under 
I.R.C.P. 84 or the Idaho Adminl-.tratJve Procedure Act • 
An appeal of a Tax Commission decision is governed by Idaho Code § 63-3049. Idaho 
Code § 63-3049 states that a taxpayer may appeal a decision of the Tax Commission by filing a 
complaint with the district court. The case is to proceed as other civil cases, but is to be a bench 
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trial. The standard of review for this appeal is de 11ovo. Parker v1 Jdaho State Ta~ 
Commission, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010). Thus, the case is treated as a regular civil 
action under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing for discovery. depositions, etc. There 
is no submission of an ugency record ms would happen under Rule 84, Idaho Rules of Ci vii 
Procedure, or the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. 
This case is not a "petition for judicial review., governed by I.R.C.P. 84. Rule 84(a)(l) 
instructs that "[ w ]hen judicial review of an action of a state agency or local government is 
expressly provided by statute but no stated procedure or standard of review is provided in that 
statute, then .Rule 84 provides the procedure for the district Court's judicial review." Idaho 
Code § 63-3049 expressly provides the procedure and standard of review for the judicial review 
of a "redetermination by the' state tax commission" (i.e., a final decision of the Tax 
Commission), and thel'efore the procedures of Rule 84, I.R.C.P., do not apply. 
This case is also not a "petition for judicial review., under the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act. Tbe administrative hearing and appeals process before the Tax Commission ls 
not conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Idaho Code § 63-107 (hearings 
before the Tax Commission concerning a redetennination of taxes "are not contested cases 
within the meaning of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code"); Idaho Code § 67-5240. 
The Tax Commission does not record the hearings or otherwise compHe nn administrative 
record. Accordingly, an appeaJ from a decision of the Tax Commission cannot be confined to a 
review of the record beJow, but must proceed as an original action in the distrkt court. 
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Finally, this is not an appeal of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. Rather, this 
proceeding ls a de navo appeaJ by the district court of the Tax Commission's decision, pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 63-3049. 
II. 
RESPONSES TO COMPLAINT 
The True Commission responds to the factual allegations of the Complaint as set forth 
below. The Tax Commission denies ench and every allegation not specifically admitted. The 
denials are made (1) bused upon the Tax Commission's lack of sufficient information to either 
admit or deny; (2) because Plaintiff's statem~nts are factually incorrect; or (3) because Plaintiff's 
assertions are legal conclusions requiring no admission or denial. 
The Tax Commission admits and asserts: Plaintiff Linda Dunn {Ms. Dunn) is and has 
been a resident of Idaho for the taxable years in question: 2000-2001, 2003-2005, and 2007-2010 
(taxable years). Ms. Dunn was married to Barry Dunn (Mr. Dunn) during all the years in 
question, until Mr. Dunn's death in 2012. 
During the taxable years, Mr. Dunn resided variousJy in the states of Washington and 
Texas where he worked and earned wages. Mr. Dunn· s wages. based upon Jabor in other states, 
is not reportabJe to Idaho. But as an Idaho resident> Ms. Dunn is required to report her income 
and pay tax in Idaho on her income from whatever source derived. However, Ms. Dunn never 
reported her community property interest in the wages that Mr. Dunn earned during the taxable 
years. 
Accordingly, the Tax Commission assessed taxes for the taxable years in the amount of 
$60,294, which amount is the tax attributable to Ms. Dunn's one-half community property 
ANSWER-3 
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interest in the wages earned by her husband. la addition to the tax assessed, statutory interest 
and penalties are owed. 
Ms. Dunn protested her tax liability. interest and penalties, attributable to the wages Mr. 
Dunn earned out·of-state, to the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission upheld the tax 
assessment by its Decision, dated June 6, 2014. Ms. Dunn has now paid the required percentage 
of her tax liability in order to pursue this appeal to the District Court. 
m. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Defendant, the Idaho State Tax Commission, asks this Court for the 
followfog relief: 
l. Dismiss the Complaint tbr failure to state a ground upon which relief can be granted. 
or jn the alternative. grant a judgment in favor of the Commission based upon the pleadings, 
and aHowing Plaintiff to take nothing by its Complaint; 
2'. Affirm the Decision of the Commission; 
3. Order Plaintiff to pay all of the Commission's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees 
incurred in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 63-3049, J 2-117, and 12-121; und 
4. Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems reasonable and necessary to 
accomplish tile demands of justice. 
DATED this / £"' day of June 2015. 
IJ?AHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I bere~y certify that on this j 5" day of June 2015, I have served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing Tax Commission's ANSWER upon Plaintiff as indicated 
below: 
RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY 
408 E. SHERMAN, SUITE 309 
COEUR D'ALENE. ID 83814 
[ Cotmsel for Plaintiff] 
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COME NOW, the parties to this action, pursuant to this Court's order, and present the 
following joint stipulated agreement: 
1. . The .P~es wis~ te>, .re~()Ive. this ~~te.r. on 8:11. 11.~e.ed-~pon recorci; . 
2. To that end, the parties will work to complete a stipulation of fact containing all 
the facts necessary for the resolution of this case, including any agreed-upon exhibits, by 
February 19, 2016; 
3. Both parties will simultaneously file and serve written argument in the form of a 
brief on or before April 1, 2016; 
JOINT STIPULATION REGARDING SCHEDULING - l 
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4. The parties agree that they will each file and serve an answering brief due on or 
before April 22, 2016; 
5. The parties reserve the right to request oral argument on the submitted record; 
6. Should the parties be unable to agree as to a stipulation of fact and agreed exhibits 
by February 19, 2016, then the above briefing schedule will be vacated and the matter will 
proceed to trial. 
DATED this '2.J day of January 2016. 
DATED this_ day of January 2016. 
DATED this_ day of January 2016. 
JOINT STIPULATION REGARDING SCHEDULING- 2 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH, PLLC 
ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH, of the Firm 
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER 
-ADMITTED .P.RO .. HAC VICE ..... 
/,/ 
RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY 
COUNSEL FOR PEmIONER 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 36 of 160 
3 /4 
208-334-7844 TAX LEGAL Idaho State Tax Commission 07:05:17a.m. 01-28-2016 
/~1., 
4. Tlttt parties agn.-e that the)' wiU each me and !erve at, 1uu1weri.r.g brief due on or 
!)eforc April 22, 2016~ 
5. The panies reseri,·c the: ri&ht to request oral at'gun1ent on tbe submitted record; 
6. Shollld the panies be unable to agr£e as tQ a stipulation of fact Md a~ exhibi1s 
by Februazy 19, 2016, then the above briefmg schedt.tl¢ will be- vac4tcd IJld the matter will 
.P~erd to triaJ. 
DA TED this_ day cf January 2016. 
DATED th~y of January 2016. 
DATED r.hia.AA1y uf Jan1.NUY2016. 
JOINr STfPULA TION REc.lAR.Or.4Ci ~CH.EDULI.NO -J 
IDAHO ST ATE TAX COMf,..flSS!ON 
DAVIO B. YOUNO 
DEPtlTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ROBERT E. KOVACEVJC.H. PLLC 
BERT fi. KOVA VJCH, of the Finn 
COU:-JSEL FOR PETITIONER 
ADMJTI".SD PRO HAC VIC.E 
RICHARD W. J<OCH.~NS1':Y 
COUNSEL FOR. PETITlONER. 
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JOINT STIPULATION OF 
FACTS 
On January 27, 2016, counsel for parties agreed to resolve this matter on the record and 
stipulate facts by February 19, 2016. 
It is hereby stipulated between the parties, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
6( e )(3) that, for the purposes of this case, the following statements may be accepted as facts and 
all exhibits referred to herein, if any, and attached hereto may be accepted as admissible without 
foundation and are incorporated in this stipulation and made a part hereof. 
1. This appeal was timely filed in this Court. 
Joint Stipulation ofFacts - I 
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2. Barry and Linda Dunn were married for all the years at issue in this case. The taxable 
years at issue are 2000-200t 2003-2005, and 2007 -2010. Linda Dunn has paid the required 
amounts to allow her to process this appeal. 
3. This case is an appeal from a final decision and order of the Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals dated April 17, 2015, No. 14-B-1450. A copy of the decision is attached as Appendix A. 
4. The parties agree that Barry Dunn's residence is not at issue in this case during any of 
the years in question. Likewise, the parties agree that Linda Dunn's residency is not at issue in 
this case. For purposes of this appeal only, and for no other purpose, the parties stipulate that 
Linda Dunn was an Idaho resident for the taxable years. However, it is stipulated that Barry 
Dunn was not an Idaho resident for any of the taxable years involved. The only issue on appeal 
from the Board of Tax Appeals is whether Linda Dunn is liable for income tax on her one-half 
community property interest in the wages earned by her husband, Barry Dunn, while he lived 
outside Idaho. 
5. The Board of Tax Appeals decision was entered only against Linda Dunn. Barry 
Dunn, Linda's deceased husband, died of cancer in 2012. No probate of Barry Dunn's estate was 
commenced in Texas, Idaho or any other state. 
6. Linda Dunn's then husband, Barry Dunn, lived in states other than Idaho during all 
years at issue in this case. The parties agree that Barry Dunn lived in Washington in 2000, in 
either Washington or Alaska in 2001; lived in Alaska in 2002; in Alaska or Texas in 2003; and 
lived in Texas from 2004 until October 2010. 
7. During all the years, Barry Dunn was employed by Udelhoven Inc., 4606 F.M. 1960 
. I.M. ~oad,. Houston, Texas, during all the years involved in the case. Udelhoven operated 
. ' . . . -
offshore drilling platforms. Barry Dunn was employed by Udelhoven as a project manager. His 
Joint Stipulation of Facts - 2 
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employment required that he be personally present at the site of the project. He always resided in 
the states where he worked. During all the years involved, he never worked in Idaho. His work 
schedule was six weeks on and one week off. During all the years in question, Udelhoven had no 
business or office in Idaho. Barry Dunn's driver licenses were always issued in the state where 
he worked. During the periods involved, he did not have an Idaho driver license. While in Texas, 
Barry Dunn's vehicle was a Jeep Liberty vehicle licensed as a Texas vehicle. He obtained a 
Texas resident driver license. During the time Barry and Linda Dunn lived in Alaska, they lived 
in a house owned by them in Nikiski, Alaska. When in Washington, they lived in a rented home 
in Bellingham, Washington. After Alaska, Barry Dunn moved to Texas and he lived in a motor-
home in Texas. Linda Dunn, until 2008, lived with Barry Dunn in the motor-home during the 
winters and returned to Idaho to operate the horse farm the rest of the year. Barry Dunn did not 
work at the horse farm. During and after 2008, Linda Dunn lived with Barry Dunn. but the 
majority of her time was spent in Idaho. All of Barry Dunn's pay from Udelhoven, his only 
employer, was directly deposited in his bank account in the city of Tomball, Texas. Both Barry 
and Linda Dunn lived at 1402 Cherry Street, Tomball, Texas. Barry Dunn's Texas resident 
driver license listed the Tomball address. All the earnings at issue in this case were earned by 
Barry Dunn personally as a wage earner in the states of Texas, Alaska or Washington. Barry 
Dunn, from 2004 through 2010, was physically present in Texas and earned the income by his 
personal effort in Texas, mostly on off-shore drilling platforms. During all the years in question, 
he never worked in Idaho or earned wages in any capacity in Idaho. 
DATED this_ day of February, 2016. 
Joint Stipulation of Facts - 3 
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0 V 
Couasel fer Linda Dunn 
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BEFORE THE IDAHO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 
RECEIVED 
APR 2 0 2015' 
LINDA DUNN, 
Appellant, 
) R.E. KOVACEVICH, P.l.LO. 
) 
) APPEAL NO. 14-8-1450 
) 
V. ) . FINAL DECISION 
) AND ORDER 
) 







INCOME TAX APPEAL 
This appeal is taken from an Idaho State Tax Commission (STC) decision 
issued June 6, 2014 on Docket No. 25096. The agency decision affirmed a 
Notice of Deficiency Determination dated April 13, 2012. The appeal 
concerns taxable years 2000, 2001, 2003 thru 2005, and 2007 thru 2010. 
This matter came on for hearing October 15, 2014 In Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
before Hearing Officer Cindy Pollock. Attorneys Richard Kochansky and 
Robert Kovacevich represented Appellant at hearing. Alan Pack represented 
Respondent STC:· 
Board Members David Kinghorn, Linda Pike and Leland Heinrich participated 
in this decision. 
The issue on appeal is the proper tax treatment of income earned by a 
spouse domiciled in a different community property state. 
The decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission is affirmed. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
For the taxable years 2000, 20011 2003 through 2005, and 2007 through 2010, 
Appellant was married, and Appellant's husband (Husband) was a resident of Texas and 
Washington and earned Texas and Washington source income. Appellant filed some part-
year income tax returns in Idaho and also earned income sourced in Idaho for some of the 
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years in question. During its review, Respondent determined in addition to Appellant's 
income, one-half(½) of Husband's income should have been included as taxable income 
for the years concerning this appeal. Appellant contested the tax treatment of Husband's 
income. 
Appellant argued the major substantive Issue In this case concerns the wages 
earned by Husband while he was in the state of Texas during the relevant tax years on 
appeal. Citing McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 Tex. 187 (1849), Appellant contended Husband was 
not a resident of Idaho and the states in which he lived controls ownership. It was 
contended, according to law, Husband's residency prevails on his Texas wages. The main 
point of contention was the domicile of husband "automatically becomes the domicile of 
wife." Further, Appellant indicated neither spouse was a resident of Idaho on Husband's 
Texas wages under the "residence by operation of law" principle. Several points of 
contention of residency, non-residency and part-time residency were raised. 
Husband passed away in 2012. Appellant argued the State Tax Commission, nor 
the Board of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter until Husband's probate is 
commenced. Federal statutes and the Constitution were cited in this regard. Respondent 
countered Husband was not a resident of Idaho during the years in question and the tax 
deficiency does not concern Husband, but rather only Appellant (Wife). 
Lastly, Appellant maintained if taxes were owed, there was authority in which 
penalties would be avoided as Appellant "acted in good faith and reasonable cause on 
income not earned in Idaho." Respondent claimed Idaho Code Section 63-3046 dictates 
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Respondent explained Appellant filed Idaho part-year/nonresident income tax 
returns for the taxable years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. On the returns, Appellant's 
losses, capital gains and/or losses, interest and dividend income were reported. On the 
2010 return some Idaho wages were also reported. In examining the 2007 through 2010 
returns, Respondent determined Appellant was a resident of Idaho in the years before this 
period. On closer review, Respondent found no Idaho individual Income tax returns had 
been flied after taxable year 1999 and before 2006. Therefore, the taxable years 2000 
through 2005 were examined. In the audit findings 1 it was reported the only time Appellant 
changed residency from Idaho was when Appellant resided in Alaska for the full-year in 
2002. Respondent found no issues with Appellant's returns for taxable years 2002 and 
2006, thereby excluding these two (2) years from the deficiency determination. 
Respondent explained information and documentation provided by Appellant 
necessitated the need for Idaho returns for tax years 2000, 2001, and 2003 through 2005. 
The documentation was in the form of a completed Idaho State Tax Commission 
Residency/Domicile Questionnaire for taxable years 2007-2009. Appellant answered a 
home was being occupied In Idaho, nothing was done to change status from resident of 
Idaho to a nonresident of Idaho, a business was operated in Idaho, and 365 days per year 
were spent in Idaho during 2007 thru 2009. Appellant also Indicated on the form she was 
registered to vote in Idaho and personal vehicles were registered in Idaho. Further 
documentation was provided in the way of two (2) Homeowner's Exemption Applications. 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 46 of 160 
Dunn 
Appeal No. 14-B-1450 
The first was dated in 1991 and signed by Appellant declaring the Idaho residence was 
being occupied by owner. Appellant sold this property in 2006 and purchased another in 
2008. The second Application was dated in 2008 and again Appellant stated the residence 
was owner-occupied. Also on the later application, Appellant declared she was a full-year 
resident, had an Idaho Driver's license, and cars were registered in Idaho. 
In addition to the non-filed returns, Appellant's income was found by Respondent 
to be Improperly reported for taxable years 2007 through 2010. Adjustments to Appellant's 
returns were made and included in the Notice of Deficiency Determination. Respondent 
contended after multiple correspondence efforts with Appellant, the only issue remaining 
was the determination and allocation of the community property income. Respondent 
explained, as a resident of Idaho, Appellant was required to report all income derived from 
any source for purposes of determining her Idaho Income tax liability. As such, 
Respondent found half of Husband's income was attributable to Appellant as taxable 
income by way of Idaho being a community property state. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This Board's goal in its hearings and other proceedings is the acquisition of 
sufficient, accurate evidence to support a final determination of a fair and just tax 
assessment. This Board, giving full opportunity for all arguments and having considered 
all testimony and documentary evidence submitted by the parties in support of their 
respective positions, hereby enters the following conclusions. 
There are several issues before the Board in this case. Each which will be 
-4-
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 47 of 160 
Dunn 
Appeal No. 14-B-1450 
addressed separately. The first question concerns Appellant's residency for each of the 
tax years relevant to this case. Appellant stated she did not reside in Idaho some of the 
years in question. However, the associated testimony was vague and it was unclear which 
years Appellant was declaring to be a resident, part-year resident, or nonresident of Idaho. 
Respondent maintained Idaho was Appellant's residency or part-time residency 
state for the years in question. From record we find Appellant owned and occupied two (2) 
residences in Idaho and received the homeowners exemption on such properties. 
Appellant operated an Idaho business for some of the years in question. Further, on the 
fdaho STC Residency/Domicile Questionnaire, Appellant declared her vehicles were 
registered in Idaho, she was registered to vote in Idaho, and maintained an Idaho drivers 
license. For tax years 2007 through 2009 Appellant declared she lived in Idaho 365 days 
each year. Appellant was receiving the homeowners exemption on her residence for all 
the years under appeal. Further, for some of the years, Appellant filed part-
year/nonresident returns. The evidence leads the Board to conclude Appellant was shown 
to be a resident of Idaho for some years and a part-year resident for others. 
Idaho Code § 63-3002 calls for levying taxes on the taxable Income from all 
sources, "wherever derived", of all Idaho residents. In this case, Appellant was a resident 
of Idaho in the relevant years asserted. As such all Appellant's income is considered 
taxable, unless expressly exempted, which is not the case here. 
A different tax treatment of Husband's income was Appellant's main contention. 
There is no dispute Appellant and Husband were married during the tax years in question. 
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Appellant and Husband chose the filing status of "married filing jointly" and filed tax returns 
accordingly. Idaho is a community property state and as a community property state, It is 
presumed all property acquired by either spouse after marriage is community property, to 
which each spouse has an undivided one-half Interest. 
Idaho Code § 32~906 provides In pertinent part, 
[t]he income, Including all the rents, issues and profits, of all property, 
separate or community, is community property unless the conveyance by 
which it Is acquired provides or both spouses, by written agreement 
specifically so providing, declare that all or specifically designated property 
and the Income ... be the separate property of the spouse to whom the 
property belongs. 
Husband's income was acquired after his marriage to Appellant. Nothing in the 
record Indicates there was any written agreement between Appellant and Husband to treat 
Husband's income as his separate property. The income is therefore presumed 
community property, to which Appellant owns a one-half interest. As a result, Appellant's 
one-half Interest in Husband's income is attributable to Appellant's taxable income under 
the relevant provisions of the Idaho Tax Code. 
The Board disagrees with Appellant's assertion that Appellant's community property 
interest remains with the state In which Husband is domiciled. Washington and Texas are 
community property states like Idaho and therefore the income is equally attributable to 
each spouse. We find one-half(½ ) of Husband's Income is attributable to Appellant and 
should be treated as such on her Idaho income tax returns. 
Appellant maintained if taxes were determined to be owed, interest and penalties 
should not apply. Respondent maintained there was no good basis for waiving the 
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penalties and interest. 
Idaho Code Section 63-3046. Penalties and additions to the tax in case of 
deficiency. (a) If any part of any deficiency is due to negligence or disregard 
of rules but without intent to defraud, five percent (5%) of the total amount 
of the deficiency (In addition to such deficiency) shall be assessed, collected 
and paid in the same manner as if it were a deficiency . 
. . . 
(c) (1) In the event the return required by this chapter is not filed on or before 
the due date (including extensions) of the return, there may be collected a 
penalty of five percent (5%) of the tax due on such returns for each month 
elapsing after the due date (Including extensions) of such returns until the 
return is filed. 
(g) Total penalties imposed under subsections (a), (c) and (d) of this section 
and under section.63-3033, Idaho Code, shall not exceed twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the tax due on the return. 
The Board does not find where the State Tax Commission must abate penalty and 
Interest. We understand the STC may impose penalty and interest as reflected in Idaho 
Code above. We have not identified any special facts or authority on which this Board 
should overturn the decision of the STC. Therefore we deny taxpayer's request for 
abatement of penalties and interest. 
For the years at issue, the Board concludes Appellant must report all income from 
Idaho sources, as well as one-half(½) of the amount of Appellant's community property 
interest in Husband's out-of-state wages. For the reasons expressed above, the Board 
affirms the conclusions and findings in the decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission. 
FINAL ORDER 
In accordance with the foregoing Final Decision, IT IS ORDERED that the decision 
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of the Idaho State Tax Commission be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
DATED this 17th day of April, 2015. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL PRIVILEGES 
Enclosed is a Final Decision and Order of the Idaho State Board of Tax Appeals 
concerning an appeal. 
Motion for reconsideration of the hearing record or motion for rehearing the appeal 
(with good cause detailed) may be made by filing such motion with the Clerk of the Board 
within ten (10) days of mailing of the Final Decision and Order, with a copy of the motion 
being sent to all other parties to the proceeding before the Board. 
According to Idaho Code§ 63~3812, either party can appeal to the district court from 
this decision. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 63-3812, the appeal shall be taken and perfected 
in accordance with Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
cp 
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APPELLANT LINDA DUNN'S 
OPENING BRIEF 
This case is on review of the Idaho State Tax Commission Decision of April 
17, 2015, Appeal No. 14-13-1450. The parties have stipulated and have agreed 
to submit this case to the Court on the stipulation and briefs of the respective 
parties. The opening briefs are due April 1, 2016. 
PROCEDURE 
Barry Dunn, the worker whose wages are at issue, died in 2012. No probate 
of Barry Dunn's estate has been commenced in any state. Linda Dunn, as 
surviving spouse, paid the assessment and by this appeal seeks a refund. 
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FACTS 
The salient facts of this case are that the residency of Barry Dunn or Linda 
Dunn, during the taxable years involved, is not an issue in this case. For 
purposes of this case, only Linda Dunn is agreed to be an Idaho resident, but not 
Barry Dunn. The stipulation is that the only issue on appeal "is whether Linda 
Dunn is liable for income tax on her one half community property, interest in the 
wages earned, by her then husband, while he lived outside ofldaho." Barry Dunn 
lived in Washington in 2000, in either Washington or Alaska in 2001, lived in 
Alaska in 2002, in Alaska and Texas in 2003, and lived in Texas from 2004 until 
October of 2010. Barry Dunn's sole employer during all the years at issue in this 
case was employed by Udelhoven Inc. as a project manager of offshore drilling 
platforms. Udelhoven was headquartered in Houston, Texas, and never had any 
business or business office in Idaho. Barry Dunn had a resident Texas drivers 
license, and always had a residence where he lived. Barry Dunn's paychecks were 
deposited in his Texas bank account. The taxable years at issue are 2000-2001, 
2003, 2005, and 2007-2010. 
Unlike Parkerv. Idaho Tax Commission, 148 Idaho 842,230 P.3d 734 (2010), 
Idaho, where the taxpayer stipulated that Idaho community property laws apply, 
id. at 846, this case applies the law of Texas where Barry Dunn lived, worked and 
was paid. Linda Dunn has not stipulated that Idaho community property laws 
apply. 
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The only income at issue is Barry Dunn's wages. 
None of the wages were earned in Idaho. 
In this case, the income in question is all wages earned by Barry Dunn, a 
non resident of Idaho. The wages were all earned by Barry Dunn as a project 
manager on location completely outside Idaho. Linda Dunn's argument is that the 
law of the place where the wages were earned applies. It is also Linda Dunn's 
position that the community property law that applied to the wages is based on 
Barry Dunn's residency, which is not Idaho. The stipulated facts include that 
Barry Dunn had a resident Texas drivers license, licensed his car as a Texas 
vehicle, and lived in Tomball, Texas. He did not have an Idaho drivers license. 
Where no income earned by a non resident is earned in Idaho, the internal 
consistency test of the Interstate Commerce Clause is violated. There is no nexus. 
Idaho is not entitled to any income tax. ITX Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 
128 Idaho 483,486,915 P.2d 713 (Idaho 1996). Like Blangers v. State, Dept. of 
Revenue and Taxation, 114 Idaho 944, 763 P.2d 1052 (Idaho 1988), the due 
process clause is violated. "No business productivity generated by Idaho was 
accountable for the wages earned-." Id. at 951. If services were not rendered in 
the state, the salary received by a non resident is not taxable. Hayes v. State Tax 
Commission, 401 N.Y.S.2d 876 (S.C.N.Y. 1978). 
In Leach v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 2004 WL 717353 
(Wis.Tax.App.Com. - Wisconsin 2004), the husband received a payment on a 
covenant not to compete from a Wisconsin company. Both husband and wife were 
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residents of Florida. Since the payment was a non tangible, the income derived 
from Wisconsin was not taxable by Wisconsin. 
The subsequent paragraphs contend that the Texas community property law 
applies to the earner if the wage income and Texas law treats wages as solely 
controlled by the earner. The wages are not subject to the debts or the non earner 
spouse. Basic federal constitutional law prevents application of the State law of 
Idaho to tax wages earned by a non resident. 
The tax in Idaho violates the Privileges and Immunities clause of the 
U.S. Constitution art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
In Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. 1191, 43 L.Ed.2d 530 
(1975). New Hampshire imposed a tax on income earned by New Hampshire 
residents out of state, but exempts the income if the tax of the state where it is 
earned does not tax the income. The state also taxed the income of a non resident 
working in New Hampshire. The court invalidated the tax on the rule of comity 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id at 665. The case held that 
disparate treatment of residents and non residents was prohibited. Here, not 
allowing an exemption if the state where the wages were earned does not have an 
income tax is disparate treatment. 
The tax fails the Internal Consistency Test. 
The state ofldaho Code, I.C. 63-2039, allows a credit for income taxes paid 
to another state. Personal earnings are taxed in the state where earned. Texas 
has no income tax. The recent case of Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. 
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Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015) applies and requires a decision 
in Linda Dunn's favor. The issue in Wynne was that the state of Maryland did not 
get a credit for a Maryland County tax on income earned in another state, but did 
get a credit against a state income tax paid on income in another state. The 
Supreme Court held that failure to give a credit for the county tax was a violation 
of the dormant commerce clause. The Court affirmed the principle that the tax 
failed the internal consistency test "because it created a risk of multiple taxation" 
by taxing income earned "interstate at a rate higher than earned intrastate." 
The Court quoted Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines Inc., 514 U.S. 
175, 179, 115 S.Ct. 1331, 131 L.Ed.2d 261 (1995) as stating that the dormant 
commerce clause prohibits state taxation even when Congress has failed to 
legislate on the subject. Id. at 1 794. The Court held that the failure to allow the 
credit "operates as a tariff' and is invalid. Id at 1804. Here internal consistency 
is only applicable if the state of Idaho allows earned income under sole control of 
the non resident spouse to be free of Idaho state tax for the reason that it was free 
of state tax in Texas where it was earned, controlled and paid. The limitation of 
credit to states that grant similar tax advantages is discriminatory and violates the 
commerce clause. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,274, 108 
S.Ct. 1803, 100 L.Ed.2d 302 (1988). Oklahoma, among other cases, at 175 cited 
and relied on Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 58 S.Ct. 546, 
821 L.Ed. 823 ( 1938). The case involved a services partnership whose only office 
and place of business was New Mexico. All the events "occur in New Mexico and 
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not elsewhere." Id. at 260. The interstate commerce was "too remote and too 
attenuated." Id. at 259. The Court held that New Mexico was entitled to the full 
amount of tax as interstate commerce of the sales of magazines was too remote. 
The same theory applies here as Idaho's community property laws cannot apply 
to a spouse who did not earn the income that her non resident spouse earned in 
Texas and elsewhere, completely outside of Idaho. The domicile of the husband 
controls, especially when payment of money is the issue. McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 
Tex. 187, 1849 WL 3994 (Texas 1849). 
All the wages earned are free of state tax where earned. The residence of a 
non earner spouse who cannot control the earnings, the earnings cannot be liable 
for Linda Dunn's debts, which would include Idaho State tax debts, hence Idaho 
has no right to tax Barry Dunn's earnings. The Wynne court also cited Ann.co Inc. 
v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984), a case holding 
that discrimination based on an interstate element is invalid. Ann.co imposed a 
state gross receipts tax higher on businesses selling steel in West Virginia than 
local sellers and manufacturers. The Court applied Boston Stock Exchange v. State 
Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) and quoted 
from the case: "No State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or 
the business operations performed in any other State." Boston Stock Exchange, 
id. at 319, imposed a tax on out of state sales more heavily than in state sales. 
These cases apply as Idaho is imposing a tax on Barry Dunn's wages, that is 
higher, solely based on the fact that Linda Dunn, the non wage earner, lived in 
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Idaho. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 
139 L.Ed.2d 717 ( 1998) involves the same tax as here involved, state income tax. 
It denied unequal income tax treatment to a non resident as a violation of the 
privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution Art. IV, § 2, entitling 
"citizens of each state add to all the Privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
several states." This is based on comity between states. "Further, the manner in 
which New York taxes nonresidents, based on an allocation of an 'as if' resident 
tax liability, not only imposes upon nonresidents' income the effect of New York's 
graduated tax rates." Id. at 314. Here, Barry Dunn has sole control of his wages, 
but is subjected to Idaho taxes. It is against public policy to apply another state's 
laws. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 123 S.Ct. 1683, 
155 L.Ed.2d 702 (2003) applied the full faith and credit clause. U.C. Const. art. 
IV,§ 1, and held that a Nevada Court was not required to apply California law. 
The Court would not apply the state of Nevada's tax collection laws to a Nevada 
resident. The Court would not balance state tax laws. Id. at 499. 
Hansen v. Scott, 687 N.W.2d 247 (S.C.N.D. 2004) followed Hyatt and applied 
Texas law to Texas residents. The place where payment is made is the place 
where the income was received. See, e.g., Insteel Industries, Inc. v. Constanza 
Contracting Co., Inc., 276 F.Supp.2d 479, 487 (D.C. Virginia 2003). Barry Dunn 
was paid in Texas. Texas law applies. Courts look to the law of the domicile for 
a reason. The domicile has the requisite contacts with a particular individual or 
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personality to generate a state interest in defining his or her property rights and 
how they may be transferred. To select, as the WPRA suggests, the law of a state 
to which the individual or personality is a stranger, constitutes no less random an 
act than blindly throwing darts at a map on the wall. Experience Hendrix L.L. C. 
v. HendrixLicensing.com, LTD, 766 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1138 (D.C.W.D. Wash. 2011) 
(holding laws negating domicile unconstitutional). A traffic stop in Minnesota that 
did not allow evidence of a California authorization for medical marijuana is not 
a constitutional violation. State v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 2014). 
"Minnesota need not incorporate California's decision to permit medical patients 
to possess and use marijuana." Id. at 615. 
The internal consistency test applies here as the wages earned in Texas were 
not taxable for Texas State income tax. Seven states have no state income tax on 
wages. The states include Alaska, Texas and Washington. These are all the 
places where Barry Dunn was a resident in this case. The Texas State 
Constitution Article 8, Section 24, mandates that the legislature alone does not 
have the right to impose a personal income tax. Subsection (a) states that a 
general law "by the legislature that imposes a tax on the net incomes of natural 
persons must provide that the portion of the law imposing the tax not take effect 
until approved by the majority of registered voters voting in a statewide 
referendum held on the question of imposing the tax." Idaho is trying to tax the 
income earned by a non resident of Idaho, earned wholly interstate in Texas, at 
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Idaho's income tax rates. Linda Dunn did not earn the income. Her husband 
earned it in Texas. 
The law of Texas, where the Idaho non resident earned the wages paid in 
Texas for the non resident's personal toil and talent while personally present in 
Texas and a non resident of Idaho, are not income in Idaho. The Texas statute on 
marital rights and liabilities, Subchapter B Management Control and Disposition, 
V.T.C.A. Family Code, Ch 3, § 3.102, states in full: 
§ 3.102 Managing Community Property 
(a) During marriage, each spouse has the sole management, 
control, and disposition of the community property that the spouse 
would have owned if single, including: 
( 1) personal earnings; 
(2) revenue from separate property; 
(3) recoveries for personal injuries; and 
(4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, 
all property subject to the spouse's sole management, 
control, and disposition. 
(b) If community property subject to the sole management, 
control, and disposition of one spouse is mixed or combined with 
community property subject to the sole management, control, and 
disposition of the other spouse, then the mixed or combined 
community property is subject to the joint management, control, and 
disposition of the spouses, unless the spouses provide otherwise by 
power of attorney in writing or other agreement. 
(c) Except as provided by Subsection (a), community 
property is subject to the joint management, control, and disposition 
of the spouses unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of 
attorney in writing or other agreement. 
Section § 3.101 states in full: "Each spouse has the sole management 
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control and disposition of that spouse's separate property." 3.102(b) also provides 
that sole management liability is not subject to the non tortious debts of the non 
earning spouse. The personal earnings of Barry Dunn were subject to his sole 
management, control and disposition in the same manner "that the spouse would 
have owned if single." If Barry Dunn was single, the property would be separate 
property. 
Sole Management Community, also called Special Property, is not liable 
for the non earners debts. 
Thomas Featherston Jr., author of "Marital Property Liabilities: Dispelling 
the Myth of the Community Debt," states: 
A. Matrimonial Property Act, 1967 
Historically in Texas, the husband managed not only the 
community property of the marriage but also the separate property 
of both spouses. A women's rights reform movement began in 1913 
with the gradual expansion over the next fifty years of the wife's right 
to manage her own separate property and personal earnings. One of 
the early changes was to grant to the wife the right to manage her 
own personal earnings and the income from her separate property. 
This reform movement culminated in 1967 when both spouses were 
granted separate but equal rights in the management of their 
respective separate properties. The Matrimonial Property Act of 1967 
also granted women for the first time the right to manage their special 
community property and equal rights with their husbands to manage 
their joint community property. This reform movement also 
introduced a complementary system of divided liability of community 
property, which also incorporated two related, but separate 
concepts": (i) liability of property and (ii) the personal liability of a 
spouse. These concepts were initially codified as Sections 5.61 and 
5.62 of the Texas Family Code enacted in 1967, effective Jan. 1, 
2000, and are codified currently as Sections 3.201, 3.202 and 3.203 
of the Texas Family Code. See Joseph W. McKnight, "Recodification 
and Reform of the Law of Husband and Wife" (Texas Bar Journal, 
Jan. 1970). 
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B. 
1. 
Texas Family Code 
SEPARATE PROPERTY 
Each spouse has sole management, control and disposition of 
his or her separate property. Tex. Fam. Code Sec. 3.101. 
2. SOLE MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
Each spouse has sole management, control and disposition of 
the community property that he or she would own, if single, including 
personal earnings, revenue from separate property, recoveries for 
personal injuries and increases and revenues from his or her "special 
community property." Tex. Fam. Code Sec. 3.102(a). 
3. JOINT MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
All other community property is subject to both spouses' joint 
management, control and disposition - "the joint community 
property." Tex. Fam. Code Sec. 3.102(b). 
C. Special Community Property 
The term "special community property" was originally defined 
by Texas courts as that portion of the community estate which was 
under the wife's exclusive control and not liable for the husband's 
debts following the landmark decision of Arnold v. Leonard, supra, 
where the Texas Supreme Court held that the legislature could not 
define the rents and revenue from the wife's separate property and 
her personal earnings as her separate property, but could exempt 
those assets, her "special community property," from his debts. Moss 
v. Gibbs, 370 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1963). Today, it is common practice 
to refer to the community assets subject to either spouse's "sole 
management, control and disposition" under Section 3.102(a) as his 
or her "special community property." One spouse's special 
community property is generally not liable during the marriage for 
the other spouse's contractual debts or any debts of the other spouse 
that were incurred prior to marriage. See Patel v. Kuciemba, 82 
S.W.3d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi, 2002 pet. Denied) and 
IV, A.2., infra . .. 
D. Summary 
A spouse's separate property and special community property, 
as well as the joint community property, are liable for that spouse's 
debts. If the liability is a tort debt incurred during the marriage, the 
other spouse's special community property is also liable fo the debt 
(the other spouse's separate property is exempt). 
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If the debt is not a tort debt incurred during the marriage, the 
other spouse's separate property and special community property are 
exempt from the debt unless the other spouse is personally liable 
under other rules oflaw. In which event, the other spouse's property 
(i.e., that spouse's special community and separate) is liable as well. 
Montemayor v. Ortiz, 208 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. Ct. Of Appeals 2006) reviews the 
law of Texas and notes that Texas labels sole management community property. 
Id. at 643. Sole management community property is not liable for the debts of the 
other spouse. Id. at 645. See also Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879 (S.C. Tex. 
1999) stating that earning capacity during marriage is sole management 
community property. Perez v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 671 (S.C. Texas 1979) 1s 
conclusive. Roberto Perez was on active duty during the marriage. A 
readjustment payment was payable for Roberto's active service, some of which 
occurred during the marriage. Marian, Roberto's exwife, petitioned for part of the 
payment as her community interest. The Court held that loss of earnings during 
marriage. The award was denied as the award was not community property. 
White v. White, 710 So.2d 208 (D.C. Fla. 1998) reviews Texas law and concludes 
that under Texas law the lump sum separation payment on discharge from the 
navy was no community property under Texas law. Id. at 211. 
Conclusion. 
Barry Dunn's wages were sole management community property and treated 
the same way as separate property. Separate property is not Community 
property. Linda Dunn is entitled to the refund. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LINDA DUNN, ) 
) CASE NO. CV-15-3329 
Plaintiff, ) 
) DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
-vs- ) 
) 




COMES NOW, Defendant Idaho State Tax Commission (Tax Commission), pursuant to 
the Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling filed herein, and submits its opening brief in support 
of its request for Judgment in its favor. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This is a personal income. tax case. 
In lieu of a trial, the parties proposed to resolve this matter on an agreed-upon record. 
See Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling, filed herein, January 28, 2016. To that end, the 
parties agreed to file a stipulation of fact "containing all the facts necessary for the resolution of 
this case." Id. Accordingly, the parties have now filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts, together with 
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one Appendix, with this Court in order to resolve this matter. Joint Stipulation of Facts, filed 
herein, February 22, 2016 ("Stipulation"). 
The chief issue to be resolved-as agreed to by the parties-is whether the Plaintiff, 
Linda Dunn (Linda), an Idaho resident, may avoid paying Idaho income tax for the taxable years 
on her comnnmity property share of the wages earned by her husband, Barry Dunn (Barry), 
while he lived and worked outside Idaho. Stipulation at ,r 4. 
Here are the main facts of this case: 
Barry and Linda Dunn were married for all the years at issue in this case. Stipulation at ,r 
2. These years at issue are 2000-2001, 2003-2005, and 2007-2010 ("taxable years"). Stipulation 
at ,r 2. Barry later died in 2012. Stipulation at ,r 5. 
For the taxable years, the Tax Commission issued a notice of deficiency in April 2012 
due to the Dunns' failure to report and pay tax on Linda's share of their income. Stipulation, 
Appendix "A." The Dunns protested the notice of deficiency to the Board of Tax Appeals. 
Stipulation. Appendix "A." 
After review, the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the Tax Commission's notice of 
deficiency, that one-half of Barry's out-of-state wages were taxable in Idaho because, according 
to Idaho community property law, one-half of those wages are attributable as income to Linda, 
an Idaho resident. Stipulation, Appendix "A.,, (The Board of Tax Appeals' Final Decision and 
Order is attached to the Stipulation as Appendix "A.") That Decision is what is being appealed 
to this Court. Stipulation at ,i 3. 
It is important to note what this case is rutt about: this Court is not being asked to make 
factual findings about Linda's or Barry's residence dwing the years in question. Stipulation at ,r 
4. That is because the parties agree that Linda was an Idaho resident. Stipulation at ,r 4. 
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Likewise, the parties agree that Barry was nQt a resident of Idaho ( either as a resident of 
Washington, Alaska, or Texas). Stipulation at ,r 4. The parties agree that, during all the relevant 
years, Barry's wages were entirely earned from his out-of-state employment. and not in Idaho. 
Stipulation at 17. 
The parties also agree that the sole issue before this Court is whether the Board of Tax 
Appeals erred when it detennined that, as an Idaho resident, Linda is entitled to a one-half share 
of the income earned by Barry while he was an out-of-state resident as community property; and 
that this one-half share is reportable in Idaho as income and subject to Idaho income tax. 
Stipulation at 1 4. 
Note: The facts of this case very closely match the facts of a recent Idaho Supreme Court 
case, involving a husband and wife and the Tax Commission, known as Parker v. Idaho State 
Tax Com'n, 148 Idaho 842,230 P.3d 734 (2010). Because the holding in the Parker case 
resolves the issue in this case (as discussed below), we append that decision to this brief for ease 
of reference. See Appendix to this brief. 
For the reasons set forth below, this Court should uphold the decision of the Board of Tax 
Appeals and enter Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A taxpayer may appeal a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals to the district court. 
Idaho Code§ 63-3812. The case is to proceed before the Court without a jury "as though it were 
an original proceeding in the district cowt" or in other words, a de novo bench trial. Idaho Code 
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§ 63-3812(c).1 The scope of the district court's review is limited to those issues presented to the 
Board of Tax Appeals. I.C. § 63-3812(c). 
A deficiency detennination of the Commission is presumed to be correct, and the burden 
is on the taxpayer to show that the deficiency is erroneous. Parsons v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission, 110 Idaho 572,574, 716 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Ct. App. 1986). The burden is on the 
party seeking affirmative relief to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Board of 
Tax Appeals' decision is "erroneous." I.C. § 63-3812(c). 
Where the parties have stipulated to the relevant facts, as here, tWs Court may simply 
apply the law to the stipulated facts. The district court is to issue a written decision with findings 
of facts and conclusions of law. I.C. § 63-3812(c). The district court's written findings of fact 
will not be disturbed unless they are "clearly erroneous." Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a). On appeal, the 
appellate court exercises "free review" over questions of law. Mann v. Granite Reeder Water Hf 
Sewer Dist., 143 Idaho 248,251, 141 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2006). 
III. ARGUMENT 
For the reasons set forth below, this Court should find that the Board of Tax Appeals' 
Decision and Order are correct, and issue Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission. 
A. As an Idaho resident, Linda is subject to Idaho income tax law and must 
report all income from whatever source derived. 
Under Idaho law, an individual's residency affects ones income tax liability. That's 
because a person's residency determines what income the State of Idaho can tax. In Idaho, it is 
1 This case is not a "petition for judicial review" governed by Rule 84, I.R.C.P. Rule 84(a)(l) instructs that "[w)hen 
judicial review of an action of a state agency or local government is expressly provided by statute but no stated 
procedure or standard of review is provided in that statute. then Rule 84 provides the procedure fur the district 
Court's Judicial review." However, Idaho Code§ 63·3812 eicpressly provides the procedure and standard ofreview 
for the judicial review of a Board of Tax Appeals decision, and therefore the procedures of Rule 84, 1.R.C.P., do not 
apply. 
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the intent of the legislature to impose a tax on Idaho residents' income "wherever derived." 
Idaho Code § 63-3002. The term "resident," for income tax purposes generally means any 
individual who is either "domiciled" in Idaho for the entire year. or who maintains a place of 
abode and who spends more than 270 days within this State. I.e.§ 63-3013. 
A "resident" is tmced on all of their income received while living in Idaho, regardless of 
where it is earned. It is well established that domicile itself affords a basis for a state's 
individual income tax. New York, ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1937) ("That 
the receipt of income by a resident of the te1Titory of a taxing sovereignty is a tmcable event is 
universally recognized. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in the state and the attendant 
right to invoke the protections of its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs 
of government.") 
Rather than needlessly arguing over residency, the parties have stipulated that Linda was 
an Idaho resident during all the taxable years. As an Idaho resident, Linda is liable for tax on her 
income, no matter the source. 
To be clear, Idaho is W2t claiming that Barry owed tax on his one-half share of his out-of-
state earnings. (Plaintiff's filings and pleadings in this case seem to confuse this issue.) While 
even nonresidents are required to pay tax on income from Idaho sources (I.C. § 63-3002), the 
parties agree that Barry's wages are not from an Idaho source. Stipulation, at~ 7. He was not a 
resident of Idaho, and that income earned is not from an Idaho source. The tax liability in this 
case is due to Linda's status as an Idaho resident. There is no need to contest whether Idaho can 
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tax one-half of Barry's out-of-state income as Idaho is not claiming he owes Idaho tax on that 
arilount.2 
In summary, because Linda was an Idaho resident during the taxable years, the receipt of 
income by her is a taxable event and she is subject to Idaho's tax laws. Cohn, 300 U.S. at 312-
313. As a threshold matter, Linda is required to report all of her income for the taxable years, no 
matter the source. I.C. § 63-3002. 
B. According to the Parker case, Linda has a one-half share in the income 
her husband earned out-of-state, and she must report that to Idaho as 
income. 
Idaho is a community property state. This means that generally, property acquired during 
the maniage is owned jointly by each spouse. Income earned during maniage, regardless of its 
source, is community property. I.C. § 32-906. Specifically, a spouse's wages earned during 
marriage are community property. Suter v. Suter. 97 Idaho 461, 466, 546 P.2d 1169, 1174 
(1976). This means that one spouse's wages acquired during the maniage is owned jointly by 
each spouse; or, each spouse owns the equivalent of a one-half interest in the value of the 
property. 
There is a legal presumption that property acquired during marriage is to be community 
property. Baruch v. Clark, 154 Idaho 732,737,302 P.3d 357,362 (2013). "[A) party wishing to 
show that assets acquired during maniage are separate property bears the burden of proving with 
reasonable certainty and particularity that the property is separate." Id. In this way, a marital 
community is analogous to a partnership where each partner shares equally in the income. 
z In the Petition filed herein, Plaintiff asserts that the State of Idaho cannot assert personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident. As a general legal principle, this is true. The Plaintiff's reference to cases like 0,gnaldson v, 
Dgnaldson. 11 Idaho 951 (1986) in support of this general principle is not incorrect. However, Plaintiff misapplies 
that case law to this case. He mistakenly thinks that Idaho is asserting jurisdiction over Barry in this case. The tax 
owed here is not due to Idaho reaching out to a non-resident and taxing that non-resident. 
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Idaho law is clear that just because members of the community may live apart does not 
change this result. ''Even when spouses are separated, their earnings and acquisitions constitute 
community property." Donaldson v. Donaldson, 111 Idaho 951,957, 720 P.2d 426,432 (Ct. 
App. 1986). This is because the marital community comes into being at marriage and only ends 
when one spouse dies or they divorce; thus, earnings of either spouse, while living separate and 
apart, if not divorced, are community property. Idaho Code§ 32-601; Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 
461,546 P.2d 1169 (1976). This community property law applies to Linda, an Idaho resident, 
and a member of a marital community. 
As an Idaho resident. Linda is required to report to Idaho half of the combined 
community income as her income. Because wages earned during the existence of marriage, and 
as an Idaho resident, Linda has a community property interest in the income that Barry earned 
during the existence of the marital community. The Tax Commission detennined that the Dunns 
did not accurately report the community property split of their community income. Linda's one-
half share of the wages earned by Barry belongs to her as a part of the community property. 
One-half of the out-of-state income is included in the community income taxable by Idaho by 
virtue of Linda's Idaho residency, and not by virtue of Barry's contacts with Idaho. 
This one-half interest in the wages earned is income to Linda. As an Idaho resident, such 
income is to be reported by Linda to Idaho for tax purposes. Linda must pay tax on her 
community share of the income her husband earned, even if that income was earned out of state. 
Federal tax Jaw, too, recognizes community income in community property states. For 
federal tax purposes. one-half of all community income is attributed to each spouse. Comm'r of 
Internal Revenue v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944); U.S. v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971). Thus, 
under federal law, in a community property state, a wife will be treated as having received one-
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half of her husband's income even though she never actually received the income, and even 
though the spouses lived apart during the tax year. See, Brent v. Comm'r oflntemal Revenue, 
630 F.2d 356 (5 th Cir. 1980). 
As stated above. the facts of this case are remarkably on point with Parker v. Idaho State 
Tax Com'n (Parker). 148 Idaho 842,230 P.3d 734 (2010). In Parker, the wife was a resident of 
Idaho (like Linda), and the husband earned wages while out of state (like Barry). Similarly, the 
couple in Parker objected to the Tax Commission taxing the wife's one-half community property 
share of the husband's out-of-state earnings. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739. 
In Parker. as here, the Tax Commission was not seeking to impose a tax on the husband, 
but rather on the Idaho resident wife. The Supreme Court held that" ... one-half of [the 
husband's] earnings were income attributable to [the Idaho resident wife] for purposes of 
taxation." Parker, 148 Idaho at 847. 230 P.3d at 739. As such, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Tax Commission's act of taxing the wife's income, "even though derived from [the husband's] 
earnings [out-of-state]." Parker. 148 Idaho at 847, 230 P.3d at 739 (emphasis added). 
Parker is "on all fours" with the case before this Court. (As noted above. a copy of the 
Parker decision is appended to this brief for ease of reference.) There, the Idaho Supreme Court 
concluded that the out-of-state husband's wages were income attributable to the resident wife. 
This Court should come to the same conclusion and uphold the Board of Tax Appeals decision 
that Linda's tax liability includes her one-half share of the income her husband earned out of 
state. 
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C. There are no constitutionnl prohibitions agninst Idaho taxing the out-of-
state income that belongs to Linda. 
There are no constitutional violations here. The facts of this case simply do not implicate 
any constitutional concerns. In the pleadings, Plaintiff makes three main constitutional 
arguments against having Linda pay tax on her community property share. None of them have 
any merit. 
1. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Article 4, § 2 of 
the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Plaintiff's argument here is founded on the 
notion that '"a citizen is not subject to pay a greater amount of income tax than a citizen who 
earns income in another state." Petition at 4. However, the Plaintiff misapprehends the situation 
here. There is no occasion here for there to be a violation under Article 4, § 2. As in Parker, the 
Tax Commission is not seeking to impose a tax on the husband. Barry is nQ! being taxed by the 
State of Idaho. Therefore, there is no occasion of Barry having to pay tax in Idaho greater than 
what he paid in another state. This argument is without substance. Rather, Linda owes tax for 
her one-half share of the wages earned by her husband, as those wages are income attributable to 
Linda. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739. 
2. Due Process: In Parker, the Idaho Supreme Court detennined that there is nothing 
in the Tax Commission's act of taxing the wife's community property share of income-even 
though that income was derived from the husband's earnings out-of-state-to implicate the Due 
Process Clause. Parker, 148 Idaho 842, 847, 230 P.3d 734, 739. That is because the "[t]he 
Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that a state has the power to tax in relation 
to a resident's income derived from sources outside the State and that there is nothing in the 
Federal Constitution to prevent this exercise of such power." Parker, 148 Idaho 842, 84 7, 230 
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P.3d 734, 739 (quoting Herndon v. West. 87 Idaho 335,340,393 P.2d 35, 37 (1964)). The 
rationale behind this is that inhabitants "are supplied many services by their state of residence 
and should contribute toward the support of the state, no matter where their income is earned." 
lg. 
3. Donnant Commerce Clause: In her Petiti.on, Linda argues that assessing tax on 
her one-half share of Barry's out-of-state earnings violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. 
"To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated by a tax statute, [a taxpayer] must 
demonstrate that the state's taxation of [her] entire income has a substantial effect on an 
identifiable interstate economic activity or market." Parker, 148 Idaho 842,847,230 P.3d 734, 
739 (internal citations omitted). There are no facts in the record that show that Idaho's taxation 
of Linda's entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity. 
Plaintiff offers no legal support and no substantive argument for applying the doctrine here. This 
argument should be disregarded. 
In summary, Plaintiff has identified no actual constitutional defects in this case. Neither 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause nor the Commerce Clause are actually implicated by the 
facts of this case; and Linda's due process rights were not violated, as the U.S. Supreme Court 
has expressly held that states have the power to tax a resident's income derived from out-of-state 
sources. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, this Court should conclude that the Board of Tax Appeals' Decision 
was correct that Linda Dunn owes income tax on her one-half share of her husband's out-of-state 
earnings. This Court should enter Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission. 
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The Tax Commission requests its fees and costs. 
DATED this----"-/ __ day of April, 2016. 
04-01-2016 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 11 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 77 of 160 
13/25 
208-334-7844 TAX LEGAL Idaho State Tax Commlnlon 03:04:22 p.m. 04-01-2016 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on th.is_,_ day of April, 2016, I have served a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Tax Commission's Defendant's Opening Brief upon Plaintiff as 
indicated below: 
ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH 
818 W RIVERSIDE A VE NO 525 
SPOKANE WA 99201 
[ Counsel for Plaintiff-
Admitted pro hac vice] 
RICHARD W KOCHANSKY 
408 E SHERMAN SUITE 309 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814 
[ Counsel for Plaintijfj 
DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 12 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission 
___ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
___ Hand Delivered 
___ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy (Fax) (509) 625-1914 
X: Email: kovacevicbrobert@questoffice.net 
___ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered ---
---Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy (Fax) (208) 765-3867 
X Email: rwkochansky@hotmail.com ·~ 
Docket No. 44378 78 of 160 
14/25 
208-334-7844 TAX LEGAL Idaho State Tax Commission 03:04:35 p.m. 04-01-2016 15/25 
/,.//0/fy-' 
pe dix 
Parker v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 
148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010) 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 79 of 160 
208-334-7844 TAX LEGAL Idaho State Tax Commission 03:04:41 p.m. 04-01-2016 
Parker v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 14& . ~ao 842 (2010) 
230 P.3d734 
148 Idaho 842 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, December 2009 Tenn. 
David and Kathy PARKER, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 




March 17, 2010. 
I 
Rehearing Denied April 29, 12010. 
Synopsis 
Background: Married taxpayers appealed from decision 
of the State Tax Commission finding that taxpayers owed 
income tax on one-half of the income earned by husband 
while he was domiciJed in Nevada. The District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Ronald J. Wilper, I., 
entered summary judgment for Commission, and taxpeyers 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Horton, J., held that; 
[ I J when wife Willi domiciled in Idaho and husband was 
domiciled in Nevada, Idaho's taxation of wife's one-half 
interest in husband's Nevada earnings did not violate due 
process; and 
[2] in order to show that the Commerce Clause was 
implicated, taxpayers needed to show that Idaho's taxation of 
wife's entire income had a substantial effect on an identifiable 
interstate economic activity or market, and taxpayers failed 
todo so. 
Affinned. 






A deficiency detennination issued by the State 
Tax Commission is presumed to be correct, and 
the burden is on the taxpayer to show that the 
Commission's decision is erroneous. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Appeal and Error 
ij,\a- Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of 
Decision Appealed from 
When appellate court reviews a district court's 
decision on summary judgment, it employs the 
same standard as that properly employed by the 
trial court when originally ruling on the motion. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Taxation 
P Decisions reviewable, right of review and 
presentation of grounds of review 
Appellate court would not address married 
taxpayers' arsument that the district court 
erred in applying Idaho, rather than Nevada, 
community property law when determining 
whether taxpayers owed income tax on one-half 
of the income earned by husband while be was 
domiciled in Nevada and wife was domiciled 
in Idaho, given that taxpayers did not raise the 
choice of law issue to the district court and the 
district court did not address the issue or mention 
Nevada community property law in its decision. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Constitutional Law 
,;=, Income taxes 
Taxation 
F Sources of income outside state 
When wife was domiciled in Idaho and husband 
was domiciled in Nevada, Idaho's taxation of 
wife's one-half interest in husband's Nevada 
earnings did not violate due process; wife 
derived income from her one-half interest in 
husband's earnings in Nevada, wife was supplied 
many services by the State, and there was 
nothing in the Constitution to prevent the State 
from taxing her income in return, regerdless of 
the fact that the income was derived from a 
WESTLAW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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'Parker v. Idaho state Tax Com'n, 14& . .10 842 (2010) 
230P.3d734 
(SJ 
source outside of the State, end in taxing one-
half of husband's Nevada earnings, the State 
Tax Commission was not seeking to impose a 
tax on husband, but rather on wife. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
Cases that cile this headnote 
Husband and Wife 
i=- Earnings of husband or wife 
Internal Revenue 
~ Community or separate income 
Tu:ation 
y:a Sources of income outside state 
Taxation 
~ Husbands or wives 
Husband's earnings in Nevada, where he was 
domiciled, were community property, and thus, 
wife's one-half interest in those earnings was 
subject to federal taxation, and because Idaho's 
taxation scheme mirrored that of federal law, for 
purposes of computing Idaho taxable income, 
just as in computing federal taxable income, 
one-half of husband's earnings were included in 
detennining wife's gross income. West's I.C.A. § 
32-906; J.C. § 63-2002 (Repealed). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
(6) Commerce 
,w- Income taxes 
Taxation 
;p Sources of income outside state 
Jn order to show that the Commerce Clause 
was implicated, mamed taxpayers, one of 
whom lived in Idaho and the other in Nevada, 
needed to show that Idaho's taxation of wife's 
entire income had a substantial effect on 
an identifiable interstate economic activity or 
market, and taxpayers failed to identify any 
interstate economic activity or market that was 
burdened by the taxation of wife's one-half 
interest in husband's Nevada earnings. U.S'.C.A. 
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 





~ fncome taxes 
To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated 
by a tax statute, a taxpayer must demonstrate 
that the stnte's taxation of her entire income has 
a substantial effect on an identifiable interstnte 
economic activity or market U.S.C.A. Const. 
Art, 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
Cases that cite this heodnote 
Commerce 
(? Powers Remaining in States, and 
Limitations Thereon 
Commerce 
""" Regulation and conduct in general; 
particular businesses 
The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets 
and participants in markets, not taxpayers, and 
therefore, the dormant Commerce Clause will 
not apply unless there is actual or prospective 
competition between entities in an identifiable 
market and state action that either expressly 
discriminates against or places an undue burden 
on interstate commerce, and this impact must 
be more than merely incidental. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
(9) Taxation 
""" Construction and operation in general 
Income tax statute, stating that it is the intent 
of the legislature by the adoption of this Act, 
insofar as possible, to make the provisions of 
the Idaho Act identical to the provisions of the 
federal Internal Revenue Code relating to the 
measurement of taxable income, says nothing 
about the application of federal provisions for 
equitable relief. West's LC.A. § 63-3002. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
(10] Tasadon 
y:,, Soun:es of income outside stnte 
Taxation 
v=- Husbands or wives 
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Federal income tax equitable relief provisions 
did not apply to case involving married 
taxpayers, one of whom lived in Idaho and 
the other in Nevada, and Idaho's taxation of 
wife's one-half interest in husband's Nevada 
earnings; federal provisions were designed 
to offer individual spouse equitable relief 
from tax liability attributable to other spouse, 
that is, as between spouses, these regulations 
penn.itted fntemal Revenue Service to allocate 
responsibility for payment of federal taxes, and 
in this case, taxpayers askod court to grant wife 
relief from tax liability on one-half of husband's 
Nevada earnings and attribute that liability to 
husband instead, and if court did this, unlike 
under federal scheme, Idaho would lose out on 
that revenue, since husband was Nevada resident 
and any state tax liability on his Nevada-sourced 
income would be owed to Nevada. 26 U.S.C.A 
§§ 66, 6015. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
(ll] Taxation 
y;- Husbands or wives 
Federal taxation statute, allowing income 
attributable to one spouse to be attributed to 
the other spouse if the first spouse does not 
file a joint return for any taxable year, was not 
applicable so as to relieve wife, who lived in 
Idaho, from tax liability on one-half ofhusband's 
Nevada earnings; wife was ineligible for relief 
under statute because she and husband had tiled 
joint returns, and she failed to establish that she 
did not know of, and had no reason to know 
of, the fact that husband was earning income in 
Nevada. 26 U.S.C.A. § 66(c). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
(12) States 
V"' Revenue and taxation 
Taxation 
'F Collection and Enforcement 
State income tax statutes provide a mechanism 
by which the State Tax Commission can grant 
equitable relief, and thus, appellate court will 
decline to read federal provisions os preempting 
them, in particular when those provisions are not 
applicable to the case at hand. West's l.C.A. §§ 
63-3047, 63-3048; 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 66, 6015. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[13) TaHtion 
iP- Judicial Review 
Although the State Tax Commission did not 
specify whether it sought attorney fees for the 
proceedings below as weU as on appeal, there 
was no indication that it mised any request for 
attorney fees with the district court, and thus, 
appellate court would only consider whether to 
award attorney fees on appeal. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
[14) Tasation 
~ Judicial Review 
State Tex Commission was entitled to attorney 
fees on appeal in connection with taxpayers• 
appeal of district court's ruling upholding 
Commission's decision that taxpayers owed 
income tax on one-half of the income earned 
by husband whi_le he was domiciled in Nevada; 
despite the fact that Herndon was dispositive of 
the due process issue in case, taxpayers failed 
to address it in their opening brief other than 
to mention that the district court relied on it 
in making its decision, and taxpayers urged 
appeUate court to consider an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal, despite long-standing 
precedent that appellate court would not do so. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14: West's I.C.A. § 63-
3049. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**736 Lawrence G. Sirhall Jr., Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General. Boise, for 
respondent. Lawrence Allen argued. 
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Opinion 
HORTON, Justice. 
*844 This appeal involves Idaho state income tax payments 
by David and Kathy Parker for income earned in 2003 and 
2004. The Idaho State Tax Commission (the Commission) 
determined that the Parkers' tax payments were deficient for 
those years. David and Kathy sought review by the district 
court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Commission. We affinn. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Parkers were married at all times during 2003 and 
2004 ("the relevant years"). Kathy was domiciled in Idaho 
and David was domiciled in Nevada throughout this time. 
The Parkers filed income tax returns with both the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Commission declaring their status 
as "married filing joint" for the relevant years. Nevada does 
not impose an individual income tax, so the Parkers did not 
tile tax returns with that state. On their Idaho returns for the 
relevant years, the Parkers reported only the income earned 
by Kathy while she was domiciJed in Idaho and did not report 
the income earned by David. 
The Commission conducted an audit of the Parkers' returns 
for the relevant years and detennined that one-half of the 
income earned by David was subject to Idaho income tax 
because Kathy was entitled to one-half of the Nevada income 
as community property. On April 2, 2007, the Commission 
issued a notice of deficiency to the Parkers, and on Moy 3, 
the Parkers' accountant tiled a petition for redetermination 
and asked the Commission for a hearing. Following the 
hearing, the Commission issued a decision 1 upholding the 
dctennination that the Parkers owed income tax on one-half 
of the income earned by David while domiciled in Nevada for 
the relevant years. 
The Parkers timely filed a petition for judicial review of 
the Commission's amended decision on February 22, 2008 
and made the security deposit required by J.C. § 63-3049. 
The Parkers alleged that the Commission's determination wu 
"capricious, without a basis in law or fact, arbitnuy and 
otherwise erroneous." The Commission responded on March 
14, 2008, pointing out that the action should proceed as a 
de novo proceeding pursuant to J.C. § 63-3049, mtber than 
as a petition for review, and therefore filed an wuwer to 
what it tenned the Parkers' "complaint." On June 24, 2008, 
the parties filed a statement of "Stipulated Facts" which 
specified, among other things, that the sole issue before the 
district court was whether the Commission erred when it 
determined that one-half of the income earned by David while 
be was domiciled in Nevada is subject to Idaho income tax. 
On July 1, 2008, the Parkers filed a motion for summary 
judgment requesting the coun to require the Commission 
to recalculate the Parkers' income tax without the inclusion 
of David's income. The Parkers also filed an affidavit from 
David in which he stated that he did not receive any 
financial assistance from Kathy or have any Idaho-sourced 
income during the years in question. The *845 *"737 
Commission filed a responsive "Affidavit of Jim Gunter 
Regarding Summary Judgment" on July 18, 2008. Gunter is 
the tax specialist with the Commission who conducted the 
redetenninotion in the Parkers' case. Although styled as an 
''affidavit," this document is something between en affidavit 
and a legal brief in which Gunter expresses his opinions as to 
questions oftex and community property law. In the affidavit, 
Gunter asserted that David would have been required to file 
an Idaho income tax return even if he and Kathy bad filed 
separate returns due to David's share of the taxable income 
from certain Idaho real estate income pass-through entities. 
The Parkers moved to strike this opinion on the basis that it 
was a legal conclusion that was for the court to make and as 
speculative and irrelevant. 
On October 23, 2008, the district court issued its 
combined "Order Denying [the Parkers'] Motion to Strike," 
"Order Denying [the Commission's] Motion to Strike," 
"Order Granting [the Commission's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment," and "Order Denying [the Parkers'] Motion for 
Summary Judgment." The court found that the Parkers 
were not entitled to equitable relief under Idaho law. The 
court also rejected the Parker's claim that the Commission's 
determination violated the Due Process Clause and the 
Commerce Clause. The Parkers timely appealed from the 
district court's final judgment in which the Commission was 
awarded $36,709. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(I) (2) A taxpayer may appeal a determination by the 
Commission by filing a complaint against the Commission 
in district court. I.C. § 63-3049. The case is to proceed 
as a de novo bench trial. I.C. § 63-3049; cf. I.C. § 
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63-3812(c). 2 A deficiency determination issued by the 
Commission is presumed to be correct, and the burden is 
on the taxpayer to show thnt the Commission's decision is 
erroneous. Albertson's Inc. v. Slate Dep'I of Revenue. 106 
Idaho 810,814,683 P.2d 846,850 (1984). 
When this Court reviews a district court's decision on 
. summary judgment, it employs the same standard as tbnt 
properly employed by the trial court when originally 
ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is proper "if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,327, 
940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
The district court upheld the Commission's decision that one-
half of David's Nevada earnings were taxable because, by 
operation of Idabo community property law, those earnings 
are income attributable to Kathy. The Parkers urge on appeal 
that the district court erred in not applying Nevada community 
property law, in not concluding that taxing one-half of David's 
earnings would *846 **738 violate due process, and in 
not striking the portions of Gunter's affidavit that asserted 
that David received income generated in Idaho. The Parkers 
also allege that the district court erred in not holding that 
taxing one-half of David's Nevada earnings would violate 
the Commerce Clause. Finally, the Parkers contend that the 
district court erred in not reading federal provisions for 
equitable relief into Idaho tax law. The Commission seeks 
attorney fees on appeal. 
A. We decline to address whether the district court 
erred In applylng Idaho rather than Nevada community 
property law. 
(3) The Parkers argue that the district court med in 
applying Idaho rather than Nevada community property law 
and that under Nevada law, David's earnings during the 
years in question might be considered separate property. 
Specifically, the Parkers allege that the district court erred 
in only discussing Idaho community property law when the 
Commission, in its amended decision, discussed both Idaho 
and Nevada community property law. The Parkers, however, 
stipulated before the district court that "[t]he Audit Division 
detennined thot one-half of the income earned by Mr. Parker 
while he was domiciled in Nevada was subject to Idaho 
Income tax because under the community property laws of 
Idaho, Ms. Parker was entitled to one-half of the Nevada 
income." There is no indication in the record that the Parkers 
said anything more regarding the choice of law to the district 
court, nnd the district court did oot address the issue or 
mention Nevada community property law in its decision . 
Accordingly, we decline to address the choice of law issue for 
the first time on appeal. Dunn v. Ba11gh, 95 Idaho 236, 238, 
506 P.2d 463, 46S (1973). 
B. We affirm the district court's holding that the 
ta:sation or Kathy's one-half Interest In David's Nevada 
earnings does not violate due process. 
(4) The Parkers assert that the State of Idaho {the State), 
through the Commission, violates due process when it taxes 
income earned outside of its borders. 
(5) It is undisputed that during the relevant years, Kathy 
was an Idaho resident and that she and David were manied 
Idaho Code § 32-906 provides that property acquired after 
marriage is community property, subject to exceptions not 
present in this case. This includes a spouse's earnings. Suter 
v. Suter, 91 Idaho 461, 466, 546 P.2d 1169, 1174 (1976). As 
David's earnings during the relevant years were community 
property, Kathy's one-half interest in those earnings were 
subject to federal taxation. Forbush v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo.1979-214, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 871, 1979 WL 3279 
(U.S.Tax Ct.) (citing Hopkins v. Baco11, 282 U.S. 122, SI 
S.Ct. 62, 7S L.Ed. 249 (1930); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118, 
51 S.Ct 62, 75 L.Ed. 247 (1930); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 
101, SI S.Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed. 239 (I 930)). See also Babcock v. 
Commissioner. T.C. Memo.1979-372,39T.C.M. l39(CCH), 
1979 WL 3424 (U.S.Tax Cl). 
Idaho's taxation scheme mirrors that offederal law. "It is the 
intent of the [Idaho] legislature ... insofar as possible to make 
the provisions of the [Idaho Income Tax ActJ identicaJ to 
the provisions of the Federal Internal Revenue Code relating 
to the measurement of taxable income .... " I.e. § 63-2002. 
Therefore, for pwposes of computing Idaho taxable income, 
just as in computing federal taxable income, one-half of 
David's earnings are included in determining Kathy's gross 
income. The question is whether the fact that this income 
derived from Nevada somehow precludes the State from 
taxing it. 
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This Court answered the question whether the State may tax 
~!)_come earned outside of its borders in Herndon v. West. 87 
Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 3S (1964). In that case, the taxpayer 
was a resident of Idaho and was also a general partner 
in an Oklahoma business from which she derived income. 
Herndo11, 87 ldaho at 338, 393 P.2d at 36. The taxpayer 
argued that the Stote's attempt to tax her Oklahoma income 
violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Id. at 340, 393 P.2d at 37. This 
Court stated that: 
The Supreme Court of the United 
St.ates has made it clear that a stale 
has the power to tax in relation to a 
resident's income derived from sources 
outside the *847 **739 State and 
that there is nothing in the Federal 
Constitution to prevent the exercise 
of such power. The rationale for 
allowing a state to compute a tax 
on income earned elsewhere is based 
on the premise that inhabitants are 
supplied many services by their state 
of residence and should contribute 
toward the support of the state, no 
matter where their income is earned. 
Id. (citations omitt~d). 
During the relevant years, Kathy was a resident ofldaho and 
derived income from her one-half interest in David's earnings 
in Nevada. Kathy Wll5 supplied many services by the State, 
and there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the State 
from taxing her income in return-regardless of the fact tbot 
the income was derived from o source outside of the State. 
The Parkers argue, however, that taxing one-half of David's 
Nevada income violates David's due process rights because 
the only contacts he has with Idaho are bis marriage to Kathy. 
With respect to the earnings that the Commission seek& to tax, 
however, David's contacts with the State are irrelevant. 3 rn 
taxing one-half of David's Nevada earnings, the Commission 
is not seeking to impose a tax on David, but rather on 
Kathy. As stated, one-half of David's earnings were income 
attributable to Kathy for pwposes of taxation. Kathy was a 
resident of Idaho. There is nothing in the Commission's act 
of taxing Kathy's income, even though derived from David's 
earnings in Nevada, that offends due process. 
~ 
C. We affirm the district court's holding that taxing oC 
one-hair oC David's Nevada earnings does not violate the 
Commerce Clause. 
(6) The Parkers also argue that taxing one-bolf of 
David's Nevada earnings violates the Commerce Clause. The 
Commission argues that because it is only seeking to tax 
Kathy's income, albeit income derived from David's Nevada 
earnings, the Commerce Clause is not implicated in this case. 
(7) (8) "To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated 
by a tax statute, [a taxpayer] must demonstrate that the state's 
taxation of [her] entire income has a substantial effect on 
an identifiable interstate economic activity or market." 71 
Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation § 391 (2009) (citing 
Stelzner v. Comm'r of Reven11e, 621 N.W.2d 736, 740 
(Minn.200 I)). 
"The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and 
participants in markets, not taxpayers as such." Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,300 [117 S.CL 811, 
825,136 L.Ed.2d 761, 781) (1997). Therefore, the donnant 
Commen-e Clause will not apply unless there is actual or 
prospective competition between entities in an identifiable 
market and state action that either expressly discriminates 
against or places on undue burden on interstate commerce. 
Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300 [117 S.Ct. at 825, 136 L.Ed.2d 
at 780-81}. Furthem1ore, this impact must be more than 
merely incidental. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
559 [115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 637-38) 
(1995). 
Stelzner, 621 N.W.2d at 740-41. 
In order to show that the Commerce Clause is implicated in 
this case, the Parkers would need to show that the State's 
taxation ofKathy's entire income has a substantial effect on an 
identifiable interstate economic activity or market They have 
failed to identify any interstate economic activity or market 
*848 **740 that is burdened by the taxation of Kathy's 
Nevada income. 
The Commerce Clause is not implicated in this case. 
Although the district court did not reach this same conclusion, 
it did ultimately hold that the Commerce Clause would not be 
violated by the Commission taxing Kathy's Nevada income. 
Thus. we affirm the district court's decision to grant summary 
judgment in favor of the Commission on this issue, albeit for 
a different reason. 
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D, We affirm the district court's decision not to read 
the federal provisions for equitable relief urged by the 
Parkers into Idaho tax law. 
The Parkers argue that the district court erred in not reading 
into Idaho law two federal provisions that they claim would 
offer them equitable relief from paying income tax on one-
half of David's Nevada earnings. The Parkers first argue 
that Idaho law should include the equivalent of26 U.S.C. § 
66, entitled "Treatment of Community Income," specifically 
section (c), which states: 
(e) Spouse relieved of UablUCy in certain other cases 
Under regulations prescn'bed by tho Secretary, if-
(1) an individunl does not file a joint return for any taxable 
year, 
(2) such individual does not include in gross income for 
such taxable year an item of community income properly 
includible therein which, in accordance with the rules 
contained in section 879(a), would be treated as the income 
of the other spouse, 
(3) the individual establishes that he or she did not know 
of, and had no reason to know of, such item of community 
income. and 
(4) taking into acc01Jnt all facts and circumstances, it is 
inequitable to include such item of community income in 
such individual's gross income, then, for purposes of this 
title, such item of community income shall be included in 
the gross income of the other spouse (and not in the gross 
income of the individual). Under procedures prescribed 
by the Secretary, if. taking into account all the facts and 
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable 
for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of 
either) attributable to any item for which relief is not 
available under the preceding sentence, the Secretary may 
relieve such individual of such liability. 
The Parkers further urge that Idaho law should include the 
equivalent of26 U.S.C. § 601S, entitled "Relief from joint and 
several liability on joint return," section (t) of which states: 
(f) Equitable relief 
Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if-
(1) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is 
inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid mx 
or any deficiency ( or nny portion of either); and 
(1) relief is not nvnilable to such individual under 
subsection (b) or (c), the Secretnry may relieve such 
individual of such liability. 
The Parkers point to J.C. § 63-3002 to support their claim 
that the above provisions should be read into Idaho law and 
applied in this case in order to afford them relief. 
(9) Idaho Code § 63-3002 states: 
It is the intent of the legislature by 
the adoption of this net, insofar as 
possible to make the provisions of the 
Idaho act identical to the provisions 
of the Federal Internal Revenue Code 
relating to the measurement of taxable 
income, to the end that the taxable 
income reported each taxable year by 
a taxpayer to the internal revenue 
seivice shall be the identical sum 
reported to this state, subject only to 
modifications contained in the Idaho 
law; to achieve this result by the 
application of the various provisions 
of the Fedeml Internal Revenue 
Code relating to the definition 
of income, exceptions therefrom. 
deductions (personal and otherwise), 
accounting methods, taxation of trusts, 
estates, partnerships and corporations, 
basis and other pertinent provisions 
to grou income as defined therein, 
resulting in an amount called "taxable 
income" in the Internal Revenue Code, 
and then to impose the provisions 
of this act thereon to derive a sum 
called *849 **741 "Idaho taxable 
income"; to impose a tax on residents 
of · this state measured by Idaho 
taxable income wherever derived and 
on the Idaho taxable income of 
nonresidents which is the result of 
activity within or derived &om sources 
within this state. All of the foregoing 
is subject to modifications in Idaho 
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law including, without limitation, 
modifications applicable to unitary 
groups of corporations, which include 
corporations incorporated outside the 
United States. 
This statute says nothing about the application of federal 
provisions for equitable relief. Further, we have made clear 
that the statute "does not incorporate by reference all 
provisions of the federal Internal Revenue Code into Idaho 
tax Jaw." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho Slale TtlX' Comm'n. 
142 Idaho 790, 796, 134 P.3d 641,647 (2006). Instead. as the 
district court properly observed. this Court has relied upon 
J.C. § 63-3002 to adopt federal tax provisions where Idaho 
law is silent, but has declined to adopt the federal tax code 
when it conflicts with Idaho law. See, e.g., Jdaho Stale Tax 
Comm'n v. Hautzinger, 137 Idaho 401,403, 49 P.3d 406,408 
(2002) (adopting federal elements of tax fraud because Idaho 
law did not provide those elements); Lockheed. 142 Idaho at 
797, 134 P.3d at 648 (declining to adopt federal requirement 
that taxpayers receiving payments under long term contracts 
report property under construction in computing income 
because under I.C. § 63-3027 property under construction 
is excluded). Idaho law does have ilS own provisions for 
equitable relief: J.C. §§ 63-3047 and 63-3048. The district 
court declined to read the above federal provisions into Idaho 
law because it found that I.C. §§ 63-3047 and 63-3048 
conflict with those provisions for the reason that, while not 
explicitly aimed nt offering equitable relief to a non-resident 
facing taxation due to operation ofldaho community property 
law. they do "provide for a method by which the taxpayer and 
the Commission may compromise a dispute." 
(10) More than conflicting with the Idaho Code, the 
federal provisions urged by the Parkers do not apply to 
the Parkers' situation. The federal provisions are designed 
to offer an individual spouse equitable relief from tax 
liability attributable to the other spouse. That is, WI between 
spouses, these regulations permit the Internal Revenue 
Service to all01:ate responsibility for payment of federal taxes. 
Christensen v. C.I.R., 523 F.3d 957,960 (9th Cir.2008) ("The 
Commissioner has the authority to relieve one spouse from 
tax liability attributable to the other. See, e.g., [26 U.S.C.] §§ 
66(c),601S(b),(c), (t).")Rev. Proc.2003-61, 2003 I.R.B. 296 
§ 4.02(l)(b) ("[T]he Service ordinarily will grant equitable 
relief under section 6015(£) ... [if] the requesting spouse 
had no knowledge or reason to know that the nonrequesting 
spouse would not pay the income tax liability.") If one spouse 
is granted equitable relief, the other spouse is liable: the 
amount to which the federal treasury is entitled is not reduced. 
/~ 
In this case, the Parkers ask us to grant Kathy relief from tax 
liability on one-half of David's Nevada earnings and attribute 
that liability to David Instead. If the Court were to do this, 
however, unlike under the federal scheme, the State would 
lose out on that revenue altogether, since David is a Nevada 
resident and any state tax liability on his Nevada-sourced 
income would be owed to Nevada. 4 
(ll) Furthermore, 26 U.S.C. § 66(c) alJows income 
attributable to one spouse to be attributed to the other 
spouse if the first spouse "does not file a joint return for 
any taxable year." Christensen, 523 F.3d at 962 ("Taken 
together, the similar and separate equitable provisions 
indicate that Congress intended spouses facing joint liability 
from community property laws to seek equitable relief under 
§ 66(c) and spouses facing joint liability from joint tax returns 
to seek equitable relief under§ 6015(t).") Kathy would be 
ineligible for relief under § 66(c) because she and David 
filed joint returns for the relevant years. Kathy has further 
failed to establish "that ... she did not know of, and had no 
reason to know or• the fact that David was earning income 
in Nevada. Again, for this reason she would not be eligible 
for relief under § 66(c). Hardy v. C.l.R., 181 F.3d 1002, 
1007--08 (1999) ("Because Hardy was *850 ••742 aware 
that Mr. Hardy was employed and earning income, she had 
reason to know of the taxable income .... Thus, the Tax Court 
properly concluded that she d.id not qualify for innocent 
spouse treatment under§ 66(c).'') 
(12) Idaho Code § 63-3002 does not explicitly state that 
the State should adopt federal provisions for equitable relief 
from tax liability. That statute has been read as not requiring 
adoption of every federal tax procedure, and this Court has 
declined to adopt federal procedures when those procedures 
conflict with prescriptions in Idaho law. Idaho Code §§ 
63-3047 and 63-3048 provide a mechanism by which the 
Commission can grant equitable relief, and thus we decline 
to read federal provisions as preempting them, in particular 
when those provisions are not applicable to the case at band. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's decision 
not to adopt the federal provisions urged by the Parkers. 
E. We award the Commission attorney fees on appeal 
(13) (14) It should first be noted that although the 
Commission does not specify whether it seeks attorney fees 
for the proceedings below as well as on appeal, there is no 
indication that it raised any request for attorney fees with 
the district court. Thus, we only consider whether to award 
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Parker v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 14b .,to 842 (2010) 
230 P.3d 734 
attorney fees on appeal. The Commission asks for an award 
of attorney fees pursunnt to J.C. § 63-3049, which states in 
relevant part that: 
We agree. Despite the fact that Herndon is dispositivc of the 
due process issue in this case, the Parkers fail to address it in 
their opening brief other than to mention that the district court 
relied on it in making its decision. Additionally, the Parkers 
urged this Court to consider an issue raised for the first time 
on appeal, despite long-standing precedent that we will not 
do so. Finally, the Parkers urged a violation of the Commerce 
Clause without showing how it applies to this case. Therefore, 
pursuant to I.e. § 63-3049(d)(2), we award the Commission 
attorney fees on appeal. 
{a) Redetermination by the state tax commission may be 
reviewed in the district court for Ada county or the county 
in which the taxpayer resides or has bis principal office 
or place of business by a complaint filed by the taxpayer 
against the state tax commission .... 
(d} Whenever it appears to the court that: 
(1) Proceedings before it have been instituted or maintained 
by a party primarily for delay; or 
(2) A party's position in such proceeding is frivolous or 
groundless; or 
(3) A party unreasonably failed to pursue available 
administrative remedies; the court, in its discretion, may 
require the party which did not prevail to pay to the 
prevailing party costs, expenses and attorney's fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We decline to consider whether the district court erred in 
applying Idaho community property law. We nffinn the 
district court's decision that taxing Kathy's income does not 
violate due process; decline to address whether the court erred 
in refusing to strike portions of Gunter's affidavit; affinn the 
district court's conclusion that the Commerce Clause is not 
violated in this cnse; and affinn the court's decision not to read 
fedeml equitable relief provisions into ldaho Jaw. Attorney 
fees and costs on appeal to the Commission. 
The Commission argues that not only is the holding in 
Her11do11 v. Wesl, 87 Idaho at 340, 393 P .2d nt 37, (that the 
State may tax the income of a resident regardless of where it Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES 
derives from) well-settled law, the Parkers failed to disclose and w. JONES concur. 
the case in their opening brief, thereby taking a frivolous 
position. All Citation& 





The decision was later amended lo correct a clerical error. 
Idaho Code § 63-3049 does not explicitly state that an appllcalion for review of a decision by the Commission, Hied 
dlrecUy with the district court Is to be heard de nova. Rather, I.C. § 63-3049(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Redetermination by the state tax commlsalon may be reviewed ... by a complaint filed by the taxpayer against the 
state tax commission within ninety-one (91) days after the receipt of notice of the decision of the state lax commission 
denying, In whole or In part, any protest of the taxpayer or, within the same period, by filing an appeal with the board 
of tax appeals. Upon the serving of summons upon the slate tax commission the case shall proceed as other civil 
cases but may be heard by the judge In chambers. 
(emphasis added). 
In the event that the taxpayer appeals to the board of tax appeals, subsequent proceedings before the district court are 
governed by LC. § 63-3812(c). That statute provides that appeals lo the district court "shall be heard and determined 
by the court without a jury In a trial de novo on the Issues In the same manner as though It were an orlglnal proceeding 
In that court." 
As these statutes ere in psrl materis, we conclude that the emphasized language of I.C. § 63-3049 directs that the 
district court proceedings are to be conducted de novo without the right to a Jury trial. 
The district court rejected the Parkers' argument by polnUng out that 
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[t)here Is evidence In the record sufficient to conclude that during the years at Issue, Mr. Parker had an Interest 
In Income producing property located In Idaho. Further, half of the mantel community was domlclled In Idaho. Mr. 
Parker has sufficient minimum contacts with the atate of Idaho to subject him to Income tax In the state. 
Presumably, the evidence that the district court was referring to Is the Information In Gunters affidavit, contained In 
paragraph 24, which Indicates that David had taxable Income derived from Idaho sources during the years In question. 
Accordingly, even If the district court erred In refusing lo strike paragraph 24 of Gunters affidavit as the Parkers now 
urge, such e"or would be harmless, and we therefore need not address the Issue. I.R.C.P. 61 ("The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect In the proceeding which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties.") 
4 The parties have stlpulated that Nevada does not impose an Income tax. 
End of Document ® 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
No. CVlS-3329 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
LINDA DUNN 
Linda Dunn, through her attorneys, replies to Defendant's Opening Brief as 
follows: 
There is no burden of proof in this appeal. 
The parties agree that this Court's review of the case is de novo. The burden 
of proof is irrelevant in this case as the determining facts are agreed upon. 
Defendant notes that issues of law are "free review." Since the appeal is on the 
question of what law applies and constitutional issues, the burden of proof does 
Reply Brief of Appellant Linda Dunn - 1 
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not apply. It is submitted that there is no burden on Linda Dunn where the 
review is de novo and facts are agreed on. The Court must apply the correct law. 
The scales of justice are balanced equally. 
The Texas law treats Barry Dunn's wages the same as separate property. 
Linda Dunn submits that Texas law applies. Since she had no right to 
Barry Dunn's wages earned by him in Texas, no taxable income can be applied to 
her in Idaho. Linda Dunn had no enforceable right to Barry Dunn's wages since 
they were deposited directly to a bank in Texas. The wages are treated as if the 
wages were separate property earned before marriage. They cannot be 
transmuted to her as Idaho income. 
The Parker case does not apply. 
Linda Dunn's Opening Brief at page 2 referred to Parker v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010). Defendant contends that the 
case is on "all fours." It is not valid precedent for choice oflaw. The reason is that 
Parker, id. at 846, never considered what law applied as the parties stipulated that 
the Idaho community property law applied. The determinative quotes from the 
case are: 
A. We decline to address whether the district court erred in 
applying Idaho rather than Nevada community property law. 
The Parkers argue that the district court erred in applying 
Idaho rather than Nevada community property law and that under 
Nevada law, David's earnings during the years in question might be 
considered separate property. Specifically, the Parkers allege that the 
district court erred in only discussing Idaho community property law 
Reply Brief of Appellant Linda Dunn - 2 
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when the Commission, in its amended decision, discussed both Idaho 
and Nevada community property law. The Parkers, however, 
stipulated before the district court that "[t)he Audit Division 
determined that one-half of the income earned by Mr. Parker while he 
was domiciled in Nevada was subject to Idaho income tax because 
under the community property laws ofidaho, Ms. Parker was entitled 
to one-half of the Nevada income." There is no indication in the 
record that the Parkers said anything more regarding the choice of 
law to the district court, and the district court did not address the 
issue or mention Nevada community property law in its decision. 
Accordingly, we decline to address the choice of law issue for the first 
time on appeal. Dunn v. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236, 238, 506 P.2d 463, 
465 (1973). Id. at 846. (Underlining added.) 
The Parker case also notes: "Additionally, the Parkers urged this court to 
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, despite long standing 
precedent that we will not do so." Id. at 850. Here, the issue of Texas law was 
raised before the Board of Tax Appeals (see pages 1, 7 of Linda Dunn's Brief of the 
Board of Tax Appeals). Pages attached. The final decision and order before the 
Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, page 2, verifies that the issue was raised by Dunn. 
It is abundantly clear that the Parker court did not consider the issue, hence, it 
is not authority on whether Idaho law or the law where the wages were earned 
applies. 
The Idaho presumption of community property does not apply. 
The Defendant urges the Court, at page 6 of its Brief, to adopt the 
presumption of community property. Barty Dunn's paychecks were not payable 
one half to Linda. "If community property is held only in one spouse's name as 
show by contract, deposit of funds or other evidence of ownership, it is 
Reply Brief of Appellant Linda Dunn - 3 
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presumably 'subject to that spouse's sole management, control and disposition'." 
In Re Wiggains, 2015 WL 1954438 at *8 (U.S. Bkcy. Ct. N.D. Texas, Dallas 
Division 2015) {construing Texas law). Due to the factual circumstances, the 
presumption is sole management special community that is not liable for debts 
of the non-earning spouse. 
The Parker case also concluded that the Idaho resident "derived income 
from her one-half interest in David's earnings in Nevada." Special community 
property in Texas is not liable for debts of the other spouse that occur during 
marriage. This was held in Patel v. Kuciemba, 82 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 
Corpus Christi 2002), cited by Linda Dunn at page 11 of her Opening Brief, 
"Special community property is that portion of the community that is under one 
spouse's exclusive control and is not liable for the other spouse's debts." Id. at 
596. The Parker case, supra at 739, held that the Idaho resident spouse was 
supplied many benefits from Idaho. Barry Dunn's wages are free of Linda Dunn's 
debts. If Idaho can collect for the services, Barry Dunn's wages are not liable. 
Only Linda's Idaho income is liable for her Idaho services. 
"Community property that a spouse would have owned if single includes, 
but is not limited to, personal earnings." In re Wiggains, U.S. Bkcy. Ct. N.D. 
Texas, Dallas Division, 2015 WL 1954438 at *8, 2015. 
The dormant Commerce Clause applies. 
The Defendant's Brief, at page 10, argues that Parker also refuses to apply 
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the dormant Commerce Clause. Parker was decided in 2010 before Comptroller 
of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, __ U.S. __ , 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed.2d 
813 (2015). That decision holds that the personal state income tax violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause. The Court held that the taxes must be internally 
consistent. Failure to allow a credit for income tax paid to another state was a 
violation. Parker denied that the dormant Commerce Clause applied because it 
did not prove that the "entire income" was affected. Id. at 739. Barry Dunn's 
entire income is affected as state tax would be paid where it was not earned. The 
place of payment controls. Barry Dunn lived and worked in Texas for a company 
that did no business and had no office in Idaho. He was a Texas resident. His 
pay was wired to his bank in Texas. Barry Dunn had no physical presence in 
Idaho. This case is stronger than Blangers v. State Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, 114 Idaho 944, 763 P.2d 1052 (Idaho 1988). In Blangers, the train 
traversed the state of Idaho and the State would have furnished emergency 
services if the train derailed. Yet, due process was violated and the income was 
not taxable. "Idaho has not given anything to the train crews for which it can ask 
return." Id. at 951. When Linda stayed with Barry in Texas, she contributed to 
his home life. While in Idaho, her contribution, if at all, could only be minimal. 
Idaho never gave anything to Barry Dunn. The offshore oil rigs were off the shore 
of Texas. Wynne rejected the "undue burden" theory of Parker in favor of the 
"practical approach," Wynne, supra at 1796. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. 
Reply Brief of Appellant Linda Dunn - 5 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 94 of 160 
art. 4, cl.2, applies. Every court must follow U.S. Supreme Court law when the 
federal commerce clause is interpreted. See, i.e., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 
1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Austin, New Energy and Lunding apply. 
The Defendant's Brief argues at page 10 that the dormant Commerce Clause 
does not apply. Dunn's Brief at page 4 cites Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 
656, 95 S.Ct. 1191, 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975), a case holding that a tax on non 
residents who earn income in New Hampshire are taxed but the New Hampshire 
residents do not have to pay the tax on income they earn out of state. The Court 
held the privileges and immunities clause was violated. The ruling was based on 
disparate treatment of non residents. 
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 108 S.Ct. 1803, 100 
L.Ed.2d 302 ( 1988) applies. It held an ethanol fuel tax credit that applied only to 
states that had a reciprocal credit was invalid as a violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. The manufacturer was based in Indiana that did not give a 
credit. "The Ohio provision at issue here explicitly deprives certain products of 
generally available beneficial tax treatment because they are made in certain other 
states, and thus on its face appears to violate the cardinal requirement of non 
discrimination." Id. at 274. Idaho allows a credit for income tax paid in another 
state. I.C. 63-2039. Here, Texas, like several other states, has no income tax. If 
Barry Dunn, the person who earned the out of state wages, had earned the wages 
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in Oregon, the taxes would be a credit and the couple would pay no Idaho tax. In 
Oregon, each spouse pays tax on their own personal earnings. The important 
reason is that Barry Dunn's wages are treated as his separate property. Idaho is 
discriminating against his non resident property rights. 
Lunding v. New YorkTax:Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139 
L.Ed.2d 71 7 ( 1998) held that allowing an alimony deduction to state of New York 
residents and denying it to non residents violated the privileges and immunities 
clause. The treatment discriminated against non residents. Id. at 315. The Texas 
Constitution prohibits state income taxation. The eight states that have no 
income taxes are discriminated against. The dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause both are violated. 
CONCLUSION 
The case must be reversed. 
DATED this __k_ day of April, 2016. 
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APPELLANT LINDA DUNN'S 
OPENING BRIEF 
This case is on review of the Idaho State Tax Commission Decision of April 
17, 2015, Appeal No. 14-13-1450. The parties have stipulated and have agreed 
to submit this case to the Court on the stipulation and briefs of the respective 
parties. The opening briefs are due April 1, 2016. 
PROCEDURE 
Barry Dunn, the worker whose wages are at issue, died in 2012. No probate 
of Barry Dunn's estate has been commenced in any state. Linda Dunn, as 
surviving spouse, paid the assessment and by this appeal seeks a refund. 
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Idaho. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 
139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) involves the same tax as here involved, state income tax. 
It denied unequal income tax treatment to a non resident as a violation of the 
privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution Art. IV, § 2, entitling 
"citizens of each state add to all the Privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
several states." This is based on comity between states. "Further, the manner in 
which New York taxes nonresidents, based on an allocation of an 'as if' resident 
tax liability, not only imposes upon nonresidents' income the effect of New York's 
graduated tax rates." Id. at 314. Here, Barry Dunn has sole control of his wages, 
but is subjected to Idaho taxes. It is against public policy to apply another state's 
laws. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 123 S.Ct. 1683, 
155 L.Ed.2d 702 {2003) applied the full faith and credit clause. U.C. Const. art. 
IV, § 1, and held that a Nevada Court was not required to apply California law. 
The Court would not apply the state of Nevada's tax collection laws to a Nevada 
resident. The Court would not balance state tax laws. Id. at 499. 
Hansen v. Scott, 687 N.W.2d 247 (S.C.N.D. 2004) followed Hyatt and applied 
Texas law to Texas residents. The place where payment is made is the place 
where the income was received. See, e.g., Insteel Industries, Inc. v. Constanza 
Contracting Co., Inc., 276 F.Supp.2d 4 79, 487 (D.C. Virginia 2003). Barry Dunn 
was paid in Texas. Texas law applies. Courts look to the law of the domicile for 
a reason. The domicile has the requisite contacts with a particular individual or 
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DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
COMES NOW, Defendant Idaho State Tax Commission (Tax Commission), pursuant to 
the Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling filed herein, and submits its reply brief in support of 
its request for Judgment in its favor, and in opposition to the Plaintiffs position. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Idaho Supreme Court has answered the main question in this case in the seminal 
decision of Parker y. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010). That 
question is: "Does Idaho have the power to impose an income tax on community property 
income derived from sources outside this state?" The answer from Parker is a resounding "yes." 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 1 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 100 of 160 
2 /15 
208-334-7844 TAX LEGAL Idaho State Tax Commission 01:09:52 p.m. 04-22-2016 
The Plaintiff's argument rests on the faulty assumption that the Tax Commission is 
trying to tax a non-resident, and the assumption that income from an out-of-state source is 
disqualified from being taxed by the Tax Commission. 
As explained more fully below, under the laws of Washington and Texas1 the wages 
earned by Barry Dunn {Barry) are "community property." As such, and as an Idaho resident, 
Idaho law requires Linda Dunn (Linda) to report and pay tax on her community property share of 
the community wages earned by Barry. She is liable for tax on income derived from whatever 
source, even if it was acquired out-of-state. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs arguments about the constitutionality of Idaho's income tax are 
flatly incorrect. A short discussion of this will follow. 
II.ARGUMENT 
For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff's arguments should be dismissed. The Court 
should find that the Board of Tax Appeals' Decision and Order are correct, and issue Judgment 
in favor of the Tax Commission. 
The parties agreed to the salient facts in this case in the Joint Stipulation of Facts, filed 
hereinJ February 22, 2016 ("Stipulation"), In this case, Barry and Linda DUM were married for 
all the years at issue (2000-2001, 2003-2005, and 2007-2010) ("taxable years"). Stipulation at ,r 
2. Linda was an Idaho resident for all the taxable years. Stipulation at ,r 4. Barry Dunn {Barry) 
never earned income in Idaho. Stipulation at ,r 7. The income at issue in this case is derived 
from his personal earnings in two states: Washington and Texas. Stipulation at ,r 7. 
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A. Because Barry resided in community property states for the taxable 
years, one-half of his income is attributed to Linda as community 
property, and is subject to Idaho income taL 
The income in question in this case was earned in two states. Washington and Texas. 
Both of these states are governed by community property laws. 
The Tax Commission will affirm for this case that Washington and Texas law apply 
when characterizing the nature of Barry's wages earned in those states. That is because the 
general principle is that the law governing movable property is the law of the domicile of the 
property owner. ~ Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 258 (1971). When spouses 
have separate domiciles at the time of acquisition of the movable property, ''the local law of the 
state where the spouse who acquired the movable [property] was domiciled at the time will 
usually be applied." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 258, comment C. As such, 
Washington law and Texas law will apply in determining the nature of Barry's personal 
earnings. i.e., a spouse's marital interest in such earnings. See also, Matter of ;Estate of Ashe. 
114 Idaho 70, 75, 753 P.2d 281,286 (Ct. App. 1988), ~ 117 Idaho 266, 787 P.2d 252 (1990). 
In doing an analysis of other states' laws, it is imperative to keep in mind that the 
question to be answered only pertains to the characterization of the income earned in those states 
as community or separate property. What is not in question is Idaho's ability to impose tax on its 
resident's income. This is an important distinction because the Plaintiff conflates the two 
concepts throughout its briefing. For example, just because Washington law may apply in 
determining whether Barry's Washington wages are community or separate property, it does not 
mean that Idaho is somehow invading Washington and seizing Barry's wages, nor does it even 
mean that it is taxing Barry's Washington wages. The bottom line is that Idaho is taxing 
whatever community property income its resident, Linda, owns due to the wages earned by her 
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husband. We will look to other states to determine solely whether those out-of-state wages are 
community or separate property. 
B. Under Washington law, Barry's wages earned in Washington are 
community property. 
Idaho, Washington, and Texas are community property states. All three consider wages 
as community property and therefore community income. See Idaho Code § 32-906, Revised 
Code of Washington (R.C.W.) § 26.16.030, and Texas Family Code§ 3.001. 
Specifically, Washington's community property law provides that income earned through 
the labor ofa spouse is presumed to be community income. RC.W. 26.16.030; Inre Marriage of 
Hurd. 848 P.2d 185 (Wa.Ct.App 1993) ("Earnings arising from services performed during 
marriage are community property"). Washington community property laws do provide an 
exception to this general principle where the husband and wife are living separate and apart even 
though they are not legally divorced. Specifically, Revised Code of Washington§ 26.16.140 
provides that "[ w]hen a husband and wife are living separate and apart, their respective earnings 
and accumulations shall be the separate property of each." Thus, under Washington law, 
earnings of a spouse are community property except where the spouses are separated and living 
apart, in which case each spouse's earnings are treated as his or her separate property. 
However, Washington courts have consistently held that in order for R.C.W. § 26.16.140 
to apply, the married couple must be living separate and apart as a result of marital discord. See, 
Aetan Life Inc. Co. v. Bunt. 754 P.2d 993 (Wash. 1988) (the marriage must be, for all practical 
purposes, "defunct."). The Washington Supreme Court has emphasized that the "separate and 
apart" requirement ofR.C.W. § 26.16.140 "contemplates permanent separation of the parties-a 
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defunct marriage." Thus, the fact that a couple is living apart is not, by itself, sufficient to give 
rise to the separate property treatment ofR.C.W. § 26.16.140. 
In this case, Linda and Barry were married during the years that Barry resided in 
Washington. Linda resided in Idaho. However, PJaintiffhas not argued this "marital discord" 
exception to explain their separation. The statement of Stipulated Facts is devoid of any mention 
of living separate and apart as a result of marital discord. Linda's decision to live apart from 
Barry appears to be based upo_n the exigencies of Barry's career. There are no facts in this 
record to carry Linda's burden to show that the marriage was, in essence, defunct. Because of 
this, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that the couple was living separate and apart as a 
result of marital discord, and the existence of their community is not negated. The income 
earned by Barry's labor is presumed to be community income. R.C.W. § 26.16.030. Barry's 
earnings are community property and his wife has a one-half interest in them. 
C. Under Texas law, the wages that Barry earned in Texas are community 
property; Linda has a one-half interest in those wages. 
In general, "community property under Texas law consists of all property either spouse 
acquired during the marriage 'other than separate property.,,, Douglas v. Delp. 987 S. W.2d 879, 
883 (Tex. 1999) (citing Tc:x. Fam.Code§ 3.002); g @lso, Texas Constitution, Article XVI,§ 15. 
In fact, like Idaho, there is a presumption in Texas law that all property held by the spouses is 
community property. Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.003. A spouse who wishes to rebut that presumption 
in order to show that property is separate property, must do so "by clear and convincing 
evidence." Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.003. 
Wages that Barry earned in Texas are community property. In Texas, the 
characterization of property as either community property or separate property is determined at 
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the time ofits acquisition, or at the "inception of title to the property." Boyd v. Boyd. 13 l 
S.W.3d 605,612 (Tex. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted). "A fundamental tenet of the 
community property system is that whatever is acquired during marriage by the talent, toil, or 
other measure of productivity of either spouse is community property. Thus, any spouse's 
personal income is community property." Mc:Clary v. Thompson, 6S S.W.3d 829,834 (Tex. 
App. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 
Texas law allows spouses to transmute all or part of their community property into 
separate property, via an "exchange" between themselves. Tex. Fam. Code§ 4.102. Such 
property, when exchanged, becomes that spouse's separate property. lg. (Idaho law, too, 
provides a mechanism for spouses to contract out of the community property scheme. Idaho 
Code§ 32-906.) Such an exchange must be accomplished by a writing and signed by the parties. 
Tex. Fam. Code§ 4.104. 
There is no evidence of a written exchange or transfer of community property. It is 
stipulated that Barry derived the Texas income in Texas, while a Texas resident. The income is 
community property which was never transmuted into separate property via exchange. Like the 
case of the wages earned in Washington, the record shows that Barry's earnings in Texas 
retained their status as community property. It would be clearly erroneous to conclude 
otherwise. The Board of Tax Appeals should be upheld on this point. 
D. The fact that Barry's personal earnings in Texas can be considered to be 
"special community property" with special management privileges, does not 
change the earnings' characterization as community property in which 
Linda bas an interest. 
The Plaintiff makes much of a distinctive feature of Texas law called "sole-management 
community property." However, as will be shown, this aspect of Texas community property law 
does not deprive Linda of her community property interest in her husband's Texas earnings. 
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The general rule in Texas (as in Idaho) regarding management rights to community 
property is that community property is subject to the joint management of both spouses unless 
the spouses agree differently in writing. Tex. Fam.Code § 3. 102(c). But unlike Idaho, Texas 
also provides that some types of community property are able to be managed by just one of the 
spouses during the marriage. This type of "sole-management community property" is provided 
for by statute and is sometimes called "special community property." Tex. Fam.Code§ 3.102. 
For purposes of this discussion, what is important to know is that personal earnings are 
subject to sole-management of each spouse. Tex. Fam. Code § 3. I 02(a). Specifically, the 
applicable statute provides that, during marriage, each spouse has sole management, control, and 
disposition of personal earnings. Id. Thus, each spouse can manage, control and dispose of 
personal earnings during the existence of the marriage. Tex. Fam.Code§ 3.102(a). 
In this case, Barry's personal earnings seem to fit within the scope of this statute and so 
during the existence of the marriage, Barry would have had sole management, control, and 
disposition of his personal earnings in Texas. 
The question becomes: if a spouse has the right to not only manage and control certain 
property, but also to dispose of that property, is that akin to the rights associated with separate 
property? Said otherwise, is "sole-management community property" really just "separate 
property" under another name? Plaintiff argues that Barry's community property personal 
earnings were subject to his sole management, control, and disposition, and so his personal 
earnings are therefore deemed to be separate property. 
However, as will be shown below, Barry's personal earnings did not transmute into 
separate property simply because he had management rights to it. 
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i. Under Texas law, property that qualifies as "sole-management 
community property" is still "community property," and not "separate 
property." 
In its brief, Plaintiff argues that Barry's wages were somehow akin to or were actually 
separate property. The suggestion seems to be that, since Barry's wages qualify as "sole 
management community property" and, because Barry may have had the legal right to control, 
manage and dispose of that property, those wages are somehow his separate property. 
However, that conclusion is wrong. 
Specifically, Texas law is clear that the non-management spouse still retains a 
community property interest in the sole-management community property: "Each spouse owns 
an undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds regardless of which spouse has 
management and control." Massey v. Massey. 807 S.W.2d 391,401 (Tex. App. 1991), writ 
denied, 867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1993) (emphasis added). That is, Linda owns an undivided one-
half interest in all community assets-including the personal earnings of Barry during the 
taxable years-regardless of the fact that Barry may have been given management and control. 
Under Texas law, there exists a "relationship of trust and confidence" between husband 
and wife which requires "that a spouse's disposition of his special community property be fair to 
the other spouse." Massey, 807 S. W .2d at 402. In other words, the sole-management spouse 
"has the burden to show that his disposition of the property was fair." Id. A violation of this 
fiduciary relationship "is termed fraud on the community because, although not actually 
fraudulent, it has all the consequences and legal effects of actual fraud because such conduct 
tends to deceive the other spouse or violate confidences that exist as a result of the marriage ... 
Knight v. Knight 301 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (emphasis 
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added). Thus, the management rights of sole-management community property are not 
unlimited. 
This is supported by the fact that, at divorce, Texas law gives the court the power to make 
a division of the entire community property estate. Tex. Fam. Code§ 7.001. Moreover, at 
death, spouses retain certain interests in the community property. See, Texas Estates Code,§ 
21.001 et seq. Also, Texas Jaw gives spouses the right to seek a claim for reimbursement in 
regard to the entire marital estate, or the entire amount of community property. Tex. Fam. Code 
§ 3.401, et seg. Clearly, the fact that one spouse may have sole-management over some 
community property does not entirely wipe away the non-managerial spouse's interests in and 
rights to that community property. 
Thus, as a member of the marital community, the non-managing spouse retains a 
community interest in community property. The particular management rights of sole-
management community property are not unlimited and do not strip away the other spouse's 
interest in the community property. And in tum, the managerial spouse has responsibilities to the 
community for the property. In other words, nothing about the management rights for sole-
management community property under Texas law deprives the underlying community property 
of its essential nature. 1 
In this vein, the Plaintiff cites to a Texas case, Perez v. Perez. 587 S.W.2d 671 (S.C. 
Texas 1979). But Perez says nothing about sole-management community property being 
considered to be separate property. Nor does it hold that a non-earning spouse has no rights to 
1 This conclusion makes sense when focusing on the plain meaning of the relevant statute. By its very 
language, sole-management community property is community property. Tex. Fam.Code § 3. 102(a). It is 
almost too obvious to state but, if the Texas legislature intended sole-management community property to 
be separate property, it would have just used the term "separate property." Instead, it carved out a scheme 
for either joint or sole-management of community property. Tex. Fam.Code § 3.102. 
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the other spouse's personal earnings. Instead, the court in Perez merely held that the payment 
received by the one spouse was a "gift." Perez, 587 S.W.2d at 673. Gifts are considered 
separate property under Texas law. Texas Fam. Code§ 3.001. In this case, we are talking about 
personal earnings, not gifts. And personal earnings in Texas are clearly community property. 
McClary. 65 S.W.3d at 834. Reference to Perez is not helpful in this case. 
In the end, "sole-management community property" is still "community property." Sole-
management community property is subject to special rules on management, but it is not 
transmuted into separate property, because the other spouse still has rights to it. Linda, as the 
non-managerial spouse .. owns an undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds 
regardless of which spouse has management and control." Massey. 807 S.W.2d at 401. Barry's 
wages earned in Texas may have been sole-management community property, but they retained 
their nature as community property. And Linda still has a community property interest in them. 
ii. The Plaintiff's reliance on Texas law pertaining to "marital property 
liability" for debt is inapplicable to this case, because the Tax 
Commission is not seeking to subject Barry's property to execution. 
The Plaintiff relies on a particular Texas statute that provides that sole-management 
community property is not subject to any nontortious liability that the other spouse incurs during 
marriage. See, Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.202 ("Rules of Marital Property Liability"); Plaintiff's 
Opening Brief at 10-12. 
The Plaintiff argues that this means that the sole-management community property in 
this case (i.e., Barry's personal earnings) cannot be considered when determining Linda's 
liability to the Tax Commission. But this is a misreading of that statute. 
Section 3.202, Tex. Fam. Code, merely prohibits a creditor from attaching sole-
management community property to satisfy the non-contractual spouse's debt. Thus, section 
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3.202 pertains to whether the property itselfis subject to execution. It is a "creditor's rights" 
provision. The statute provides that. if one spouse enters into a contractual debt, a creditor 
cannot subject the other spouse's sole-management community property to satisfy the debt. To 
underscore that this is a creditor's rights statute, we note that in the same chapter, there is a 
section which governs the order of "execution." Tex. Fam. Code § 3 .203 ("Order in Which 
Property is Subject to Execution°}. 
The Plaintiff's discussion of this creditors' rights/property liability statute is inapt. Here, 
the Tax Commission is not a judgment creditor seeking to subject Barry's personal earnings in 
satisfaction of Linda's debt. It is not attaching Bany's sole-management community property. 
This Court is simply not being asked to determine "marital property liability." 
Instead, this Court's job is to conduct a characterization inquiry ("Is it separate or 
community property?"). Property characterization is something wholly different than 
determining the extent certain property is liable against the claims of a judgment creditor. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Section 3.202, Tex. Fam. Code .. Rules of Marital Property Liability" is 
beside the point. 
E. The Plaintifrs constitutional concerns are not implicated in this case. 
In its brief, the Plaintiff puts forward several different constitutional arguments. 
l. Wynne: The United States Supreme Court holding in the case known as Wynne 
is not relevant to the case before this Court. Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne. 
135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792, 191 L. Ed. 2d 813 (2015). The dispute in Wynne involved Maryland's 
taxing scheme that did not offer its residents a full credit against the income taxes that they pay 
to other states. Maryland's tax scheme created an incentive for taxpayers to opt for intrastate 
rather than interstate economic activity. Id. The case before this Court does not involve an 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 11 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 110 of 160 
12 /1S 
208-334-7844 TAX LEGAL Idaho State Tax Commission 01: 14:26 p.m. 04-22-2016 
argument about a credit for taxes paid in another state. The question in this case is whether half 
the income earned by Barry in Texas is considered to be the income of Linda by way of 
community property law; and if so, is it then subject to Idaho income tax because Linda was a 
resident ofldaho during the years at issue. Wynne does not apply. 
2. Privileges and Immunities Clause: The holding in Austin v. New Hampshire, 
involving the Privileges and Immunities Clause, is not relevant to the case before this Court. 420 
U.S. 656, 95 S. Ct. 1191 (1975). The issue in Austin was that the New Hampshire Commuters 
Income Tax scheme fell exclusively on the income of nonresidents and was not offset by other 
taxes imposed on residents alone; their taxing scheme could not be sustained because it lacked 
substantial equality of treatment for the citizens of the taxing State and nonresident 
taxpayers. Austin, 420 U.S. at 665, 95 S. Ct. 1191 at 1197. 
In the case before this Court, there is nothing being imposed on a non-resident that isn't 
imposed on a resident; Idaho is not seeking to impose tax on a non-resident. Rather, the state of 
Idaho is seeking to impose income tax on an Idaho resident, Linda Dunn, based on the principle 
that half of the income earned by her husband in Washington and Texas is hers because of 
community property law. 
3. Domicile: The Plaintiff persists in arguing that a husband's domicile affects or 
somehow controls the domicile of the wife. Plaintiff says, "The domicile of the husband 
controls, especially when payment of money is at issue." Plaintiff Opening Brief at 6 ( citing a 
Texas case from the year 1849). And in its Petition, Plaintiff states, 0 The residency of Linda 
Dunn, for purposes of determining whether any of her husband's income derived from his 
personal labor, remains at his state ofresidency which is Texas." Petition at 2 {emphasis added). 
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However, it is emphatically not the law that the wife's domicile follows that of her 
husband's. Of course, there was a time when a ma.med woman's residency was subsumed into 
her husband's; however, that is no longer the case. It is clear from the Parker case, as well as all 
the modem cases dealing with the domicile of spouses, that a husband and a wife can have 
separate legal domiciles. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
The Plaintifr s arguments all seem to flow from the view that the State of Idaho is 
somehow directly tmcing Barry's wages. However, that view is fundamentally incorrect. The 
taxation in this case is not on Barry Dunn or his wages; the only taxation here is on the income of 
Linda Dunn, an Idaho resident. The taxes imposed on Linda Dunn's income are proper, correct, 
and constitutional. 
For this and the reasons stated above, this Court should conclude that the Board of Tax 
Appeals' Decision was correct that Linda Dunn owes income tax on her one-half share of her 
husband's out-of-state earnings. This Court should enter Judgment in favor of the Tax 
Commission. 
DA TED this 2- -:2- day of April, 2016. 
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AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Linda Dunn ("Petitioner") filed this petition for judicial review from a final decision of 
the Idaho State Tax Commission ("Defendant"). Petitioner and Defendant have filed a joint 
stipulation of facts and submitted the matter to the Court on the briefing. Petitioner is represented 
by Robert E. Kovacevich, Attorney at Law, and Richard W. Kochansky, Attorney at Law. 
Defendant is represented by David B. Young, Deputy Attorney General. 
I. FACTS 
The facts herein are taken from the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties on 
February 22, 2011. This is an agency appeal from a decision of the Idaho Tax Commission 
entered on April 17, 2015. This appeal was timely filed with this Court. Petitioner paid the 
security deposit required to allow this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-3049(b ). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR WDICIAL REVIEW 1 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 114 of 160 
Petitioner was married to Barry Dunn for all the years relevant to this action. The taxable 
years at issue are: 2000-01, 2003-05, and 2007-10. During the years in question Mr. Dunn 
worked for Udelhoven Inc., a Texas company. Mr. Dunn generally lived and had his place of 
domicile in those states in which he was working. At no time was Mr. Dunn domiciled in the 
State of Idaho. Mr. Dunn resided in Washington in 2000 and was domiciled in Washington or 
Alaska in 2001. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Alaska during 2002. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in 
Alaska or Texas during 2003. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas from 2004 through 2010. 
Petitioner was domiciled in Idaho during all of the years in question. 
All of the wages earned by Mr. Dunn were deposited into his bank account in the city of 
Tomball, Texas. Mr. Dunn never performed any work, or earned any wages in the State of 
Idaho. Petitioner and Mr. Dunn filed federal tax returns as married filing jointly during the years 
in question. The Idaho State Tax Commission levied a deficiency against Petitioner's one-half 
community property interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. The decision entered by the Idaho Tax 
Commission was only addressed to income Defendant attributed to Petitioner. Mr. Dunn passed 
away in 2012. To date there has been no probate of Mr. Dunn's estate. 
Petitioner argues the earnings of Mr. Dunn in Texas were special community property 
and cannot be subject to the debts of Petitioner. Further, Petitioner argues Idaho's taxation of 
wages earned by a non-resident spouse violates the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitutions. Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision 
of the Idaho State Tax Commission, a refund of all amounts paid for the years in question, and 
that Petitioner be paid interest on the amounts paid. 
Defendant argues that it has not imposed a tax on Mr. Dunn, rather it has imposed 
personal income tax on Petitioner reflecting her one-half community interest in the earnings of 
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Mr. Dunn. Defendant avers that Petitioner is required to report her income and pay tax in Idaho 
on her income regardless of the source of that income. Defendant argues that both Texas and 
Washington are community property states and both recognize that a non-earning spouse has a 
one-half vested interest in the wages earned by the earning spouse. Further, Defendant argues 
that as a resident Petitioner is subject to the tax provisions of the State of Idaho. Defendant 
requests the Complaint be dismissed, the decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission be 
affinned, and all of Defendant's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defending this 
action be awarded. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A taxpayer may request review of a decision by the Tax Commission to the district court 
by filing a complaint against the Tax Commission pursuant to Idaho Code§ 63-3049. "The case 
proceeds as a de novo bench trial in the district court." Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148 
Idaho 842, 845, 230 P.3d 734, 737 (2010). The reviewing court will proceed with the review as 
it would any other civil case. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 
790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). The court will utilize the Commission record only as the 
stated position of a party to the civil action. Id. 
II. DISCUSSION 
1. Character of the Wages of Mr. Dunn. 
a. In Texas property is characterized as community or separate at the time 
property is acquired. 
Characterization of property 1s determined by the time and circumstances of its 
acquisition. Leighton v. Leighton, 921 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex.App 1996) citing Carter v. Carter, 
736 S.W.2d 775, 780 (Tex.App. 1987). "This doctrine, known as inception of title, arises when a 
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party first has right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested." Scott v. 
Estate of Scott, 973 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.App. 1998). 
Personal earnings are community property if earned during marriage. Maben v. Maben, 
574 S.W.2d 229,232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Though personal earnings are community property, 
Texas law has classified this kind of community property as "special community." Valdez v. 
Ramirez, 574 S.W.2d 748, 750-51 (Tex.1978). "Special community is community property that 
is subject to one spouse's sole management, control, and disposition." Valdez, 574 S.W.2d at 
750-51. Personal earnings are subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the 
employee spouse. Medenco, Inc. v. Myklebust, 615 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1981). Each spouse 
owns an undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds regardless of which 
spouse has management and control. Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1975). Generally, the character of earnings as community property attaches when those earnings 
accrue. Loaiza v. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d 894, 909 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
Petitioner argues that Texas law applies to the wages of Mr. Dunn and treats those wages 
as Mr. Dunn's separate property. Reply Brief L. Dunn at 2. Petitioner avers that she had no 
enforceable right to her husband's wages because Mr. Dunn exercised sole dominion and control 
over his earnings. Id. Therefore, Petitioner argues that because she had no right in the wages of 
her husband the wages cannot be transmuted into community property for purposes of income in 
Idaho. Id. Moreover, Petitioner argues that because Mr. Dunn's earnings are special community 
property Mr. Dunn's earnings are not subject to liability for the debts incurred by Petitioner. 
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4. 
Defendant argues that while the law of the state where the wages were earned determines 
the character of the property at issue, Texas law provides that wages earned during marriage are 
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community property. Defendant's Reply Brief at 3. Defendant contends that Petitioner's one-
half interest in the wages of Mr. Dunn is properly subject to personal income tax in the State of 
Idaho. Id. 
Texas case law makes clear that wages earned during marriage are community property. 
There is no dispute that Petitioner and Mr. Dunn were married during the period of time in 
question. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas during the years in question. Petitioner was 
domiciled in Idaho during this same period. The issues regarding the Texas wages earned by Mr. 
Dunn are whether Petitioner had a one-half interest in those wages and whether wages 
characterized as special community property are treated as separate property for purposes of 
Petitioner's Idaho income tax. 
Wages earned by a spouse domiciled in Texas are presumptively community property 
and each spouse owns a one-half undivided interest in those wages. See Maben, 574 S.W.2d 
229, 232. Where those wages are earned by one spouse and are subject to the sole management 
and control of the earning spouse, Texas law characterizes them as special community property. 
Valdez, 574 S.W.2d at 750-51. However, this characterization does not divest the non-earning 
spouse of her one-half undivided interest in those wages, nor does it transmute those wages from 
community property to separate property as Petitioner suggests. Petitioner's one-half undivided 
interest in Mr. Dunn's wages vested at the same time Mr. Dunn's interest vested: when they were 
earned. 
Special community property does possess some of the characteristics of separate 
property. However, Petitioner's argument that special community property cannot be liable for 
the tax liability of the non-earning spouse is not supported in the law. In Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 
S.W.2d 690 (Ct. App. Texas 1998), the Texas Court of Appeals held: 
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While the trial court can determine whether the parties will file a 
joint return or as married filing separately for years preceding the 
divorce, the court cannot alter the means of reporting income. It 
does have the discretion to apportion the payment of taxes as 
between the parties. . . . Thus, a spouse may be liable for the 
entire tax liability although the income was totally earned by 
the other spouse. If a husband and wife file as married filing 
separately, each is liable only for the tax due on his or her own 
return. See Edith Stokby v. C.lR., 26 T.C. 912, 1956 WL 
725(A)(l 956). 
Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Tex. App. 1998) (emphasis added). While Kimsey 
dealt with liability of a spouse regarding federal taxes, the rationale sounds in the present case. It 
follows that if a spouse can be responsible for the entire tax liability of the marriage, they are 
responsible for the liability of both spouses even if the liable party is the non-earning spouse. 
Thus, a non-earning spouse may have tax liability even where the income would be considered 
special community property. Further, Defendant is not seeking the wages of Mr. Dunn to satisfy 
a debt, rather, it is assessing a tax on Petitioner for her one-half interest in income earned during 
marriage. 
This Court is to determine whether Petitioner had a vested interest in the community 
property of the marriage. Under Texas law, as well as Idaho law, this Court determines that 
Petitioner did have an interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. 
Further, the tax liability in the present case is based on Petitioner's one-half undivided 
interest in the Texas earnings of Mr. Dunn. The interest in the earnings of Mr. Dunn vested in 
Petitioner at the time they accrued. The Court determines that Texas law is dispositive of the 
character of the earnings. Once that characterization is made (as it is here) that Petitioner had a 
one-half undivided interest in the wages then Idaho law applies to Petitioner's interest in those 
wages based on Petitioner's domicile in Idaho. The state of domicile at the time property is 
acquired determines the characterization of property as community or separate. See Berle v. 
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Berle, 97 Idaho 452,546 P.2d 407 (1976) (finding marital property acquired in New Jersey prior 
to couple relocating in Idaho was characterized by the law of the domicile at the time of 
acquisition). Petitioner's domicile at the time she received an interest in Mr. Dunn's wages was 
Idaho. Therefore, as an Idaho resident, Petitioner's one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's income is 
subject to the tax laws of the State ofldaho. 
b. In Washington property is characterized as community or separate at the 
time property is acquired. 
The character of property is determined by the law of the domicile at the time of its 
acquisition. In re Marriage of Landry, 699 P.2d 214,216 (Wash. 1985). "The theory underlying 
community property is that it is obtained by the efforts of either the husband or wife, or both, for 
the benefit of the community." Togliatti v. Robertson, 190 P.2d 575 (Wash. 1948). However, 
Revised Code of Washington§ 26.16.140 provides that the respective earnings of a husband and 
wife who are living separate and apart "shall be the separate property of each." See Beakley v. 
Bremerton, 105 P.2d 40 (Wash. 1940) (citing Revised Code of Washington§ 26.16.140). "The 
law distinguishes between a 'marital' and a 'community' relationship, the latter concept 
encompassing more than mere satisfaction of the legal requirements of marriage. It is the fact of 
community that gives rise to the community property statute; when there is no 'community', 
there can be no community property." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 754 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Wash. 
1988), opinion modified on denial of reconsideration (July 28, 1988). 
In order for earnings attributed to one spouse to be considered the separate property of 
the earning spouse there must be some showing that the marriage is defunct. MacKenzie v. 
Sellner, 361 P.2d 165 (Wash. 1961). The Washington Supreme Court has defined defunct as 
follows: 
A marriage is considered "defunct" when both parties to the 
marriage no longer have the will to continue the marital 
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relationship. In other words, when the deserted spouse accepts the 
futility of hope for restoration of a normal marital relationship, or 
just acquiesces in the separation, the marriage is considered 
"defunct" so that the "living separate and apart" statute applies. 
In re Marriage of Short, 890 P.2d 12 (Wash. 1995) (internal citations omitted). 
In the present case Mr. Dunn's wages earned in Washington is properly considered 
community property. There has been no showing that the marriage between Mr. Dunn and 
Petitioner was defunct. In order for Mr. Dunn's wages to be considered his separate property 
Petitioner is required to demonstrate there was no normal marital relationship and there was hope 
for restoration of the unity. This Court determines that Petitioner's marriage to Mr. Dunn was 
not defunct as that term is understood under Washington law. Therefore, Petitioner had a vested 
interest in the community property wages earned by Mr. Dunn in the State of Washington. As 
with the wages earned in Texas, the wages earned in Washington are subject to taxation under 
the laws of the State of Idaho as the domicile of Petitioner. 
c. Wages earned outside of Idaho by a non-resident spouse are attributable as 
income to a resident non-earning spouse. 
"Idaho Code § 32-906(1) defines as community property all property acquired after 
marriage by either husband or wife which is not separate property as specified in I.C. § 32-903 ." 
Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 360, 815 P.2d 1094, 1100 (Ct. App. 1991). The Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that all earning of either spouse were to be included as community 
property up until the date of divorce. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976). This 
includes earnings during any separation. Id. A resident non-earning spouse is generally subject 
to personal income tax in Idaho for her community property interest in wages earned in another 
state by a non-resident spouse. Parker v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 
(2010). Wages earned by a non-resident spouse in another state are attributable as personal 
income to the resident spouse. Id. 
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In Parker the Court quoted: 
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that a 
state has the power to tax in relation to a resident's income derived 
from sources outside the State and that there is nothing in the 
Federal Constitution to prevent the exercise of such power. The 
rationale for allowing a state to compute a tax on income earned 
elsewhere is based on the premise that inhabitants are supplied 
many services by their state of residence and should contribute 
toward the support of the state, no matter where their income is 
earned. 
Id., 148 Idaho at 846-47, 230 P.3d at 738-39 (quoting Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 
35 (1964)). 
In the present case Mr. Dunn earned wages in Washington and Texas during the years in 
question. At no time was Mr. Dunn a resident of Idaho. Petitioner was a resident of Idaho 
during all relevant years. During that time Mr. Dunn's wages can be properly characterized as 
the property of the marital community pursuant to Texas, Washington, and Idaho law. As a 
resident of Idaho Petitioner's interest in Mr. Dunn's wages is attributable to her as income and as 
such, is taxable by the State of Idaho. 
2. The Commerce Clause. 
"To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated by a tax statute, [a taxpayer] must 
demonstrate that the state's taxation of [her] entire income has a substantial effect on an 
identifiable interstate economic activity or market." Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148 
Idaho 842,847,230 P.3d 734, 739 (2010) (quoting 71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation§ 391 
(2009) (citing Stelzner v. Comm'r of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.2001)). 
Petitioner must show that application of Idaho's taxing statute somehow substantially 
affects interstate commerce for the Commerce Clause to be implicated. United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). Commerce is defined as "the commercial 
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 9 
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission Docket No. 44378 122 of 160 
115 S.Ct. 1624 (citation and internal quotation omitted). The purpose of the dormant Commerce 
Clause is not "to protect state residents from their own state taxes." Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 
252, 266, 109 S.Ct. 582 (1989). Rather, "[t]he dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and 
participants in markets." General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300, 117 S.Ct. 811 
(1997). Therefore, Petitioner must make an initial showing that Idaho's income tax statute has a 
substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market. 
In Parker the Petitioner sought judicial review of a tax assessment based on one-half of 
her husband's Nevada income. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739. The petitioner argued 
that Idaho's taxation of her interest in her husband's income violated the Commerce Clause. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held: 
"The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and 
participants in markets, not taxpayers as such." Gen. Motors Corp. 
v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 [117 S.Ct. 811, 825, 136 L.Ed.2d 761, 
781] (1997). Therefore, the dormant Commerce Clause will not 
apply unless there is actual or prospective competition between 
entities in an identifiable market and state action that either 
expressly discriminates against or places an undue burden on 
interstate commerce. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300 [117 S.Ct. at 825, 136 
L.Ed.2d at 780-81]. Furthermore, this impact must be more than 
merely incidental. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 [115 
S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 637-38] (1995). Stelzner, 621 
N.W.2d at 740-41. 
In order to show that the Commerce Clause is implicated in 
this case, the Parkers would need to show that the State's taxation 
of Kathy's entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable 
interstate economic activity or market. They have failed to identify 
any interstate economic activity or market that is burdened by the 
taxation of Kathy's Nevada income. The Commerce Clause is not 
implicated in this case. 
Id, 148 Idaho at 847-48, 230 P.3d at739-40. 
Petitioner argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Comptroller of 
the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed. 2d 813 (2015), stands for the 
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proposition that a Idaho's personal income tax scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause 
because Mr. Dunn's entire income is affected and Mr. Dunn had no contact with the State of 
Idaho. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5. Moreover, Petitioner argues a violation because Mr. 
Dunn's income would be taxed in a state where it was not earned. Petitioner also argues that 
case law provides that where non-residents are taxed on income earned in New Hampshire, but 
residents of New Hampshire are not taxed on income earned out of state violated the privileges 
and immunities clause because of the disparate treatment of residents and non-residents. 
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6 (citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. 1191 
(1975)). Defendant argues that Parker is dispositive of the matter in the present case. 
Defendant's Reply Brief at 11. 
Petitioner's reliance on Wynne is misplaced. It is true that the Supreme Court held that 
Maryland's tax scheme violated the internal consistency test. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1802-05, 191 
L.Ed. 813. However, the reason for the Court's decision was based on Maryland's disparate 
treatment of non-resident taxation as compared to the tax paid by residents. Id. The Court 
illustrated the disparity showing a non-resident would suffer double taxation under Maryland's 
taxation scheme while a resident's tax liability would be half that of the non-resident. Id. The 
Court concluded: 
[T]he dormant [ c ]ommerce [ c ]lause precludes states from 
discriminat[ing] between transactions on the basis of some 
interstate element. . . . This means, among other things, that a 
[s]tate may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it 
crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the [s]tate ... 
. Nor may a [s]tate impose a tax [that] discriminates against 
interstate commerce either by providing a direct commercial 
advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate commerce 
to the burden of multiple taxation. 
id. The same facts do not apply here. Petitioner's contention that Mr. Dunn's entire income 
is affected is not persuasive. Defendant has assessed tax liability only to Petitioner's one-half 
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interest in wages earned in Texas and Washington. The analysis would be the same if the wages 
were earned entirely within the State of Idaho, or any other state. It cannot be said that Petitioner 
is subject to any internal inconsistency, nor is the tax liability disproportionately applied to non-
residents as compared to residents. Petitioner realized a one-half interest in the wages of Mr. 
Dunn pursuant to the community property laws of Texas and Washington and is subject to 
income tax on that interest in the State of Idaho. Further, Petitioner's interest is the only interest 
subject to Idaho tax liability. Defendant has not assessed a personal income tax on Mr. Dunn's 
interest in his earnings. Petitioner has failed to show a substantial effect on an identifiable 
interstate economic activity or market and Petitioner has not demonstrated how any economic 
activity or market is burdened by the taxation of Petitioner's interest in income earned in Texas 
and Washington. Further, there can be no violation of the privileges and immunities clause 
because Petitioner has not shown disparate treatment between non-resident and resident tax 
liability. Again, it is not the income attributable to Mr. Dunn that is being taxed; Defendant is 
taxing only Petitioner's vested one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. 
Therefore, the Court determines that Parker is dispositive of the current issue. The 
Commerce Clause is not implicated by Defendant's taxation of Petitioner's one-half interest in 
the wages earned by Mr. Dunn in Texas and Washington during the years in question. 
3. Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Idaho Code § 63-3049 reads in pertinent part: 
[ w ]henever it appears to the court that: (1) proceedings before it 
have been instituted or maintained by a party primarily for delay; 
or (2) a party's position in such proceeding is frivolous or 
groundless; or (3) a party unreasonably failed to pursue available 
administrative remedies; the court, in its discretion, may require 
the party which did not prevail to pay to the prevailing party costs, 
expenses and attorney's fees. 
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Idaho Code § 63-3049(d). Idaho Code § 12-117 provides for reasonable fees and costs if the 
court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho 
Code § 12-117. Further, Idaho Code § 12-121 allows the trial judge to award reasonable fees 
and costs in a civil action at her discretion. Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
This Court does not determine that this review was initiated for purposes of delay, nor did 
Petitioner fail to pursue any administrative remedies. The only basis under Idaho Code § 63-
3049 that Respondent may receive fees and costs is if Petitioner's position was frivolous or 
groundless. 
A position is not frivolous merely because it ultimately fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 
Idaho 687, 778 P.2d 809 (1989). "The sole question is whether the losing party's position is so 
plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 92,803 P.2d 993,998 (1991). 
The issue presented in the petition for review was not so plainly fallacious as to be 
determined frivolous or groundless. There is sparse case law dealing with the issue presented by 
Petitioner and the characterization of property as separate or community is generally controlled 
by the law of the state where property is acquired. The community property laws of Texas are 
similar in many ways to the laws of Idaho. However, there is a distinct difference in the manner 
of characterization of wages earned in Texas as compared to Idaho. This distinction, in large 
part, provided foundation for Petitioner's argument. It cannot be said that Petitioner's argument 
lacked foundation or was plainly fallacious. While Parker is on point with this Court's decision, 
in that case there was a stipulation as to what law applied, thus, the Parker Court did not address 
the precise issue addressed here. 
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The Court determines Petitioner's argument, while ultimately failing, was not devoid of 
merit. Therefore, Respondent's prayer for reasonable fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 
60-3049, 12-117, and 12-121 is denied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Petitioner had a vested one-half interest in the wages earned by Mr. Dunn during the 
years in question. During that time Petitioner was domiciled in the State of Idaho. Petitioner is 
subject to personal income tax in her one-half interest in the wages earned by Mr. Dunn during 
the relevant years in Washington and Texas. The Commerce Clause is not implicated in the 
present case because Petitioner has failed to show how Idaho's taxation scheme of Petitioner's 
entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market. 
Further, Petitioner cannot show that Idaho's taxing scheme fails the internal consistency analysis. 
Petitioner's argument was not frivolous, groundless, or otherwise lacking a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
For these reasons, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Commission's Final Decision and Order is AFFIRMED. 
DATED this ~ay of June, 2016. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, IDAHO TAX COMMISSION AND 
DAVID YOUNG, ITS ATTORNEY, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF 
IDAHO, P.O. BOX 36, BOISE, ID 83722-0410, David.Young@tax.idaho.gov 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Linda Dunn, appeals against the above named 
Respondent, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment 
Notice of Appeal - 1 
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Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Petition for Review, entered 
on the above proceeding on June 8, 2016, by Honorable Judge, Cynthia 
K.C. Meyer, District Judge, Kootenai County. A copy of the Order being 
appealed is attached to this Notice. 
2. Linda Dunn has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court as she has 
paid the tax alleged as due and the order described above in paragraph one 
is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17. 
3. The facts are undisputed that Linda Dunn's husband, now deceased, was 
a Texas resident and was never an Idaho resident during the years involved. 
All the income involved were wages earned by Barry Dunn in Texas while 
living there. All his wage income was deposited in a Texas bank. No proof 
was in the record that Linda Dunn actually received any of the wage 
income. Texas has a peculiar statute, V.T.C.A. Family Code, Ch. 3, § 3-
102(a)(l), treating wages as separate property. The District Court ignored 
the relevant Texas law and held that Barry Dunn's wages were subject to 
Linda Dunn's tax debts. This is not the law. See, Montemayor v. Ortiz, 208 
S.W.3d 627, 645 (Tex. Ct. of App. 2006). The District Court also failed to 
follow Blangers v. State Dept. Of Revenue and Taxation, 114 Idaho 944, 763 
P.2d 1052 (Idaho 1988) holding that if the state provides no services and 
the income is earned elsewhere. The trial court's opinion distinguished 
Parker v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 148 Idaho 790, 134 P.3d 734 (2010) 
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at page 13, but nonetheless, applied it. The court also failed to recognize 
that the reciprocal credit of state income tax statute, LC. 63-2039, creates 
a discrimination against the rule of comity in eight states with no income 
tax, U.S. Const. Art. IV§ 2 cl. 3. The District Court failed to recognize the 
Texas law has a constitutional provision, Article 8, Section 24, that states 
that no personal income tax can be imposed "until approved by a majority 
of the voters voting in a statewide referendum held on the question of 
imposing the tax." On July 3, 1890, " ... Congress passed the Idaho 
Statehood Act, admitting Idaho into the Union 'on an equal footing' with the 
original states." Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262, 270, 121 S.Ct. 2135, 150 
L.Ed.2d 326 (2001). This requires the case to apply Lunding v. New York 
TaxAppeals, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139 L.E.2d 117 (1980) giving the 
same privileges and immunities in Idaho that Barry Dunn, a resident of 
Texas, enjoyed by the Texas Constitution. 
4. No order has been sealed. 
5. The case was heard on stipulation without trial. No record transcript is 
requested. 
6. No additional documents are included. 
7. No exhibits are needed to be enclosed. 
The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
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Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. -rl, 
DATED this --/-l day of July, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Richard W. Kochansky, hereby certify that a copy of this Notice of Appeal 
has been sent by Email and by First Class Mail to: 
David B. Young 
Phil N. Skinner 
Deputies Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, ID 83722-0410 
DATED this /J. ,J, day of July, 2016. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
s3~'l 
CASE NO. CV-1~ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFtS 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Linda Dunn ("Petitioner") filed this petition for judicial review from a final decision of 
the Idaho State Tax Commission ("Defendant"). Petitioner and Defendant have filed a joint 
stipulation of facts and submitted the matter to the Court on the briefing. Petitioner is represented 
by Robert E. Kovacevich, Attomey at Law, and Richard W. Kochansky, Attorney at Law. 
Defendant is represented by David B. Young, Deputy Attorney General. 
I. FACTS 
The facts herein are taken from tbe Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties on 
February 22, 2011. Th.is is an agency appeal from a decision of the Idaho Tax Commission 
entered on April 17, 2015. This appeal was timely filed with this Court. Petitioner paid the 
security deposit required to allow this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-3049(b ). 
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Petitioner was married to Barry Dunn for all the years relevant to this action. The taxable 
years at issue are: 2000-01, 2003-05, and 2007-10. During the years in question Mr. Dunn 
wotlced for Udelhoven Inc., a Texas company. Mr. Dunn generally lived and had bis place of 
domicile in those states in which he was working. At no time was Mr. Dunn domiciled in the 
State of Idaho. Mr. Dunn resided in Washington in 2000 and was domiciled in Washington or 
Alaska in 2001. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Alaska during 2002. Mr. Dunn was domiciled ·in 
Alaska or Texas during 2003. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas from 2004 through 2010. 
Petitioner was domiciled in Idaho during all of the years in question. 
All of the wages earned by Mr. Dunn were deposited into his bank account in the city of 
Tomball, Texas. Mr. Dunn never perfonned any work, or earned any wages in the State of 
Idaho. Petitioner and Mr. Dunn filed federal tax returns as married filing jointly during the years 
in question. The Idaho State Tax Commission levied a deficiency against Petitioner's one--half 
community property interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. The decision entered by the Idaho Tax 
Commission was only addressed to income Defendant attributed to Petitioner. Mr. Dunn passed 
away in 2012. To date there has been no probate of Mr, Dunn,s estate. 
Petitioner argues the earnings of Mr. Dunn in Texas were special community property 
and cannot be subject to the debts of Petitioner. Further, Petitioner argues Idaho's taxation of 
wages earned by a non-resident spouse violates the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and 
lmmunities Clause of the United States Constitutions. Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision 
of the Idaho State Tax Commission, a refund of all amounts paid for the years in question, and 
that :Petitioner be paid interest on the amounts paid. 
Defendant argues that it has not imposed a tax on Mr. Dunn, rather it bas imposed 
personal income tax on Petitioner reflecting her one-half community interest in the earnings of 
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Mr. Dunn. Defendant avers that Petitioner is required to report her income and pay tax in Idaho 
on her income regard.less of the source of that income. Defendant argues that both Texas and 
Washington are community property states and both recognize that a non-earning spouse has a 
one-half vested interest in the wages earned by the earning spouse. Further, Defendant argues 
that as a resident Petitioner is subject to the tax provisions of the State of Idaho. Defendant 
requests the Complaint be dismissed, the decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission be 
affirmed, and all of Defendant's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defending this 
action be awarded. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A taxpayer may request review of a decision by the Tax Commission to the district court 
by filing a complaint against the Tax Commission pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-3049. "The case 
proceeds as a de novo bench trial in the district court." Parker v. Idaho Stats Tax Comm'n, 148 
Idaho 842. 845t 230 P.3d 734) 737 (2010). The reviewing court will proceed with the review as 
it would any other civil oase. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 
790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). The court will utilize the Commission record only as the 
stated position of a party to the civil action. Id. 
n. DISCUSSION 
1. Character of the Wages of Mr. Dunn. 
a. In Texas property is characterized as community or separate at the dme 
property is acqu:lred. 
Characterization of property is determined by the time and circumstances of its 
acquisition. Leighton v. Leighton, 921 S.W.2d 365,367 (Tex.App 1996) citing Carter v. Carter, 
736 S.W.2d 775, 780 (Tex.App. 1987). nThis doctrine, known as inception of title, arises when a 
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party first has right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested.,~ Scott v. 
Estate of Scott, 973 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.App. 1998). 
Personal earnings are community property if earned during marriage. Maben v. Maben, 
574 S.W.2d 229,232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Though personal earnings are community property, 
Texas law has classified this kind of community property as "special community." Valdez v. 
Ramirez, 514 S,W.2d 748, 750-51 (Tex.1978). "Special community is community property that 
is subject to one spouse's sole management, control. and disposition.'' Valdez, 514 S.W.2d at 
750-51. Personal earnings are subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the 
employee spouse. Medenco, Inc. v. Myklebust, 615 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1981). Each spouse 
owns an undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds regardless of which 
spouse has management and control. Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1975). Generally, the character of earnings as community property attaches when those earnings 
accrue. Loaiza v. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d 894,909 (Tex. Ct App. 2004). 
Petitioner argues that Texas law applies to the wages of Mr. Dunn and treats those wages 
as Mr. Dunn's separate property. Reply Brief L. Dunn at 2. Petitioner avers that she had no 
enforceable right to her husband's wages because Mr. Dunn exercised sole dominion and control 
over his earnings. Id. Therefore, Petitioner argues that because she had no right in the wages of 
her husband the wages cannot be t:ransmuted into community property for puzposes of income in 
Idaho. Id. Moreover, Petitioner argues that because Mr. Dunn~s earnings are special community 
property Mr. Dunn's earnings are not subject to liability for the debts incurred by Petitioner. 
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4. 
Defendant argues that while the law of the state where the wages were earned determines 
the character of the property at issue, Texas law provides that wages earned during marriage are 
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community property. Defendant's Reply Brief at 3. Defendant contends that Petitioner•s one-
half interest in the wages of Mr. Dunn is properly subject to personal income tax in the State of 
Idaho. Id. 
Texas case law makes clear that wages earned during marriage are community property. 
There is no dispute that Petitioner a.nd Mr. Dunn were married dming the period of time in 
questiorL Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas during the years in question. Petitioner was 
domiciled in Idaho during this same period. The issues regarding the Texas wages earned by Mr. 
Dunn are whether Petitioner bad a one-half interest in those wages and whether wages 
characterized as special community property are treated as separate property for purposes of 
Petitioner's Idaho income tax. 
Wages earned by a spouse domiciled in Texas are presumptively community property 
and each spouse owns a one-half undivided interest in those wages. See Maben, 514 S. W.2d 
229,232. Where those wages are earned by one spouse and are subject to the sole management 
and control of the earning spouse, Texas law characterizes them as special community property. 
Valdez, 514 S.W.2d at 750-51. However, this characterization does not divest the non-earning 
spouse of her one-half undivided interest in those wages, nor does it transmute those wages from 
community property to separate property as Petitioner suggests. Petitioner's one-half undhtided 
interest in Mr. Dwm's wages vested at the same time Mr. Dwm's interest vested: when they were 
earned. 
Special community property does possess some of the characteristics of separate 
property. However, Petitioner's argument that special community property cannot be liable for 
the t.ax liability of the non-earning spouse is not supported in the law. In Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 
S. W.2d 690 (Ct App. Texas 1998), the Texas Court of Appeals held: 
. MRMQRANTIIJM DEClSJON ANO ORDER ON Pl..AINTlFF'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RBVJ.EW 






Jun, 8. 2016 12:13PM JUDGE SIMPSON 
~-
No. 7601 P. 6/15 
.. 
While the trial court can determine whether the parties will file a 
joint return .or as .married filing separately for years preceding the 
divorce, the court cannot alter the means of reporting income. It 
does have the dlscretion to apportion the payment of taxes as 
between the parties. . . . Thus, a spouse may be liable for the 
entire tax liability although the income was totally earned by 
the other spouse. If a husband and wife file as married filing 
separately, each is liable only for the tax due on his or her own 
return. See Edith Stokhy v. C.lR., 26 T.C. 912, 1956 WL 
725(A)(1956). 
Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Tex. App. 1998) (emphasis added). While Kimsey 
dealt with liability of a spouse regarding federal taxes. the rationale sounds in the present case. It 
:follows that if a spouse can be responsible for the entire tax liability of the marriage, they are 
responsible for the liability of both spouses everi if the liable party is the non-earning spouse. 
Thus, a non-earning spouse may have tax liability even where the income would be considered 
special community property. Further, Defendant is not seeking the wages of Mr. Dunn to satisfy 
a debt. rather, it is assessing a tax on Petitioner for her one-half interest in income earned during 
marriage. 
This Court is to determine whether Petitioner had a vested interest in the community 
property of the marriage. Under Texas law, as well as Idaho law, this Court detennines that 
Petitioner did have ari interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. 
Further, the tax liability in the present case is based on Petitioner,s one-half undivided 
interest in the Texas earnings of Mr. Dunn. The interest in the earnings of Mr. Dunn vested in 
Petitioner at the time they accrued. The Court determines that Texas law is dispositive of the 
character of the earnings. Once that characterization is made ( as it is here) that Petitioner had a 
onewhalfundiv.ided interest in the wages then Idaho law applies to Petitioner;s interest in those 
wages based on Petitioner's domicile in Idaho. The state of domicile at the time property is 
acquired determines the characterization of property as community or separate. See Berle v. 
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Berle, 91 Idaho 452, 546 P.2d 407 (1976) (fmding marital property acquired in New Jersey prior 
to couple relocating in Idaho was characterized by the law of the domicile at the time of 
acquisition). Petitioner's domicile at the time she received an interest in Mr. Dunn's wages was 
Idaho. Therefore. as an Idaho resident, Petitioner,s one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's income is 
subject to the tax laws of the State ofidaho. 
b. In Washington property is characterized as community or separate at the 
ibne property is acquired.. · 
The character of property is determined by the law of the domicile at the time of its 
acquisition. In re Marriage of Landry, 699 P.2d 214, 216 (Wash. 1985). "The theory underlying 
community property is that it is obtained by the efforts of either the husband or wife, or both, for 
the benefit of the community." Togliatti v. Robertson, 190 P.2d 515 (Wash. 1948). However, 
Revised Code of Washington § 26.16.140 provJdes that the respective eamings of a husband and 
wife who are living separate and apart "shall be the separate property of each." See Beakley v. 
Bremerton, l0S P.2d 40 (Wash. 1940) (citing Revised Code of Washington§ 26.16.140). "The 
law distinguishes between a 'marim.P and a 'community' relationship, the latter concept 
encompassing more than mere satisfaction of the legal requirements of marriage. It is the fact of 
community that gives rise to the community property statute; when there is no 'community', 
there can be no community property.'' Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 154 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Wash. 
1988), opinion modified on denial of reconsideration (July 28, 1988), 
In order for earnings attributed to one spouse to be considered the separate property of 
the earning spouse there must be some· showing that the marriage is defunct. MacKenzie v. 
Sellner, 361 P.2d 165 (Wash. 1961). The Washington Supreme Court has defined defunct as 
follows: 
A marriage is considered "defunct,, when both parties to the 
marriage no longer have the will to continue the marital 
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relationship. In other words, when the deserted spouse accepts the 
futility of hope for restoration of a normal marital relationship, or 
jusf acquiesces in the separation, the marriage is considered 
"defunct', so that the "living separate and apart'' statute applies. 
In re Marriage of Short, 890 P.2d 12 (Wash. 1995) (internal citations omitted). 
In the present case Mr. Dunn's wages eamed' in Washington is properly considered 
community property. There has been no showing that the marriage between Mr. Dunn and 
Petitioner was defunct. In order for Mr. Dunn's wages to be considered bis separate property 
Petitioner is required to demonstrate there was no nonnal marital relationship and there was hope 
for restoration of the unity. This Court determines that Petitioner's marriage to Mr. Dunn was 
not defunct as that term is understood under Washington law. Therefore, Petitioner had a vested 
interest in the community property wages earned by Mr. Dunn in the State of Washington. As 
with the wages eamed in Texas, the wages earned in Washington are subject to taxation under 
the laws of the State ofidaho as the domicile of Petitioner. 
e. Wages earned outside of Idaho by a non-resident spouse are attributable as 
income to a resident non•eandng spouse. 
"Idaho Code § 32-906(1) defines as community property alJ property acquired after 
marriage by either husband or wife whfoh is not separate property as specified in I.C. § 32-903.'' 
Desfosses v. Deefosses, 120 Idaho 354, 360, 815 P.2d 1094, 1100 (Ct. App. 1991). The Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that all earning of either spouse were to be included as community 
property up until the date of divorce. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976). This 
includes earnings during any separation. Id. A resident non-earning spouse is generally subject 
to personal income tax in Idaho for her community property interest in wages earned in another 
state by a non-resident spouse. Parker v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 148 Idaho 842,230 P.3d 734 
(2010). Wages earned by a non-resident spouse in another state are attributable as personal 
income to the resident spouse~ Id. 
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In Parker the Court quoted! 
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that a 
state has the power to tax in relation to a resident's income derived 
from sources outside the State and that there is nothing in the 
Federal Constitution to prevent the exercise of such power. The 
rationale for allowing a state to compute a tax on income earned 
elsewhere is based on the premise that inhabitants are supplied 
many services by their state of residence and should contribute 
toward the support of the state, no matter where their income is 
earned. 
Id., 148 Idaho at 846-47, 230 P.3d at 738~39 (quoting Herndon -v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 
35 (1964)). 
In the present case Mr. Dunn earned wages in Washington and Texas during the years in 
question. At no time was Mr. Dunn a resident of Idaho. Petitioner was a resident of Idaho 
during all relevant years. During that time Mr. Dunn's wages can be properly characterized as 
the property of the marital community purmant to Texas, Washington, and Idaho law. As a 
resident of Idaho Petitioner's interest in Mr. Dunn's wages is attributable to her as income and as 
such, is taxable by the State of Idaho. 
2. The Coinmerce Clause. 
"To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated by a tax statute, [a taxpayer] must 
demonstrate that the state's taxation of [her] entire income bas a substantial effect on an 
identifiable interstate economic activity or market.» Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148 
Idaho 842,847,230 P.3d 734, 739 (2010) (quoting 71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation§ 391 
(2009)(citingStelznerv. Comm'ro/Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 736, 740(Minn,2001)). 
Petitioner must show that application of Idaho's taxing statute somehow substantially 
affects interstate commerce for the Commerce Clause to be implicated. United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). Commerce is defined as '~e commercial 
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches.n Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553, 
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115 S.Ct. 1624 (citation and internal quotation omitted). The purpose of the dormant Commerce 
Clause is not "to protect state residents from their O\.Vl'l st.ate taxes.,, Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 
252,266, 109 $.Ct. 582 {1989). Rllther, "[t]he dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and 
participants in markets." General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300, 117 S.Ct. 81 J 
(1997). Therefore, Petitioner must make an initial showing that ldaho,s income tax statute has a 
substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market. 
In Parker the Petitioner sought judicial review of a tax assessment based on one-half of 
her husband's Nevada income. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847, 230 P.3d at 739. The petitioner argued 
that Idaho's taxation of her interest in her husband's income violated the Commerce Clause. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held: 
"The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and 
participants in markets, not taxpayers as such." Gen. Motors Corp. 
v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,300 [117 S.Ct. 811,825, 136 L.Ed.2d 761, 
781] (1997), Therefore, the donmmt Commerce Clause will not 
apply unless there is actual or prospective competition between 
entities in an identifiable market and state action that either 
expressly discriminates against or places an undue burden on 
interstate commerce. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300 [117 S.Ct. at 825, 136 
L.Ed.2d at 78()...81]. Furthermore, this impact must be more than 
merely incidental. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 [115 
S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 637-38] (1995). Stelzner, 621 
N.W.2d at 740-41. 
In order to show that the Commerce Clause is implicated in 
this case, the Parkers would need to show that the State's taxation 
of Kathy's entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable 
interstate economic activity or market. They have failed to identify 
any interstate economic activity or market that is burdened by the 
taxation of Kathy's Nevada income. The Commerce Clause is not 
implicated in this case. 
Id, 148 Idaho at 847-48, 230 P.3d at739-40. 
Petitioner argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Comptroller of 
the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed. 2d 813 (2015), stands for the 
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proposition that a Idaho's personal income tax scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause 
because Mr. Dunn's entire income is affected and Mr. Dunn had no contact with the State of 
Idaho. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5. Moreover, Petitioner argues a violation because Mr. 
Dunn's income would be taxed in a state where it was not eamed. Petitioner also argues that 
case law provides that where non-residents are taxed on income earned in New Hampshire. but 
residents of New Hampshire a.re not taxed on income earned out of state violated the privileges 
and immunities clause because of the disparate treatment of residents and ·non-residents. 
Petitioner•s Reply Brief at 6 (citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. t 191 
(1975)). Defendant argues that Parker is dispositive of the matter in the present case. 
Defendant's Reply Brief at 11. 
Petitioner's reliance on Wynne is misplaced. It is true that the Supreme Court held that 
Maryland's tax scheme violated the internal consistency test. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1802-05, 191 
L.Ed. 813. However, the reason for the Court's decision was based on Maryland1s disparate 
treatment of non-resident taxation as compared to the tax paid by residents. Id. The Court 
illustrated the disparity showing a non-resident would suffer double taxation under Maryland's 
taxation scheme while a .resident's tax liability would be half that of the non-resident. Id. The 
Court concluded: 
[1]he dormant [ o ]ommerce [ c ]lause precludes states from 
discriminat[ing] between transactions on the basis of some 
interstate element . . . This means, among other things, that a 
[ s Jtate ma.y not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it 
crosses state lines than when it OCCW'S entirely within the fs]tate ... 
. Nor may a [s]tate impose a tax [that] discriminates against 
interstate commerce either by providing a direct commercial 
advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate commerce 
to the burden of multiple taxation. 
Id. The same facts do not apply here. Petitioner's contention that Mr. Dunn's entire income 
is affected is not persuasive. Defendant has assessed tax liability only to Petitioner's one-half 
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interest in wages earned in Texas and Washington. The analysis would be the same if the wages 
were earned entirely withln the State of Idaho, or any other state. It cannot be said that Petitioner 
is subject to any internal inconsistency> nor is the tax liability disproportionately applied to non-
residents as compared to residents. Petitioner realized a one-half interest in the wages of Mr. 
Dunn pursuant to the community property laws of Texas and Washington and is subject to 
income tax on that interest in the State ofldaho. Further, Petitioner's interest is the only interest 
subject to Idaho tax liability. Defendant has not assessed a personal income tax on Mr. Dunn's 
interest in his earnings. Petitioner has failed to show a substantial effect on an identifiable 
interstate economic activity or market and Petitioner has not demonstrated how any economic 
activity or market is burdened by the taxation of Petitioner9s interest in income ea.med in Texas 
and Washington, Further, there can be no violation of the privileges and immunities clause 
because Petitioner has not shown disparate treatment between non-resident and resident tax 
liability. Again, it is not the income attributable to Mr. Dunn that is being taxed; Defendant is 
taxing only Petitioner's vested one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. 
Therefore, the Court determines that Parker is dispositive of the current issue. The 
Commerce Clause is not implicated by Defendant's taxation of Petitioner's one-ha.Jf interest in 
the wages earned by Mr. Dunn in Texas and Washington during the years in question. 
3. Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Idaho Code § 63-3049 reads in pertinent pa.rt: 
[w]henever it appears to the court that: (1) proceedings before it 
have been instituted or maintained by a party primarily for delay; 
or (2) a party's position in such proceeding is :fiivolous or 
groundless; or (3) a party unreasonably failed to pursue available 
administrative remedies; the court. in its discretion, may require 
the party which did not prevail to pay to the prevailing party costs, 
expenses and attorney's fees. 
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Idaho Code § 63-3049(d). Idaho Code § 12-1 I 7 provides for reasonable fees and costs if the 
court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho 
Code§ 12-117. Further, Idaho Code§ 12-121 allows the trial judge to award reasonable fees 
and costs in a civil action at her discretion. Idaho Code § 12-121. 
This Court does not determine that this review was initiated for purposes of delay, nor did 
Petitioner fail to pursue any administrative remedies. The only basis wider Idaho Code § 63-
3049 that Respondent may receive fees and costs is if Petitioner•s position was frivolous or 
groundless. 
A position is not frivolous merely because it ultimately fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 
Idaho 687, 778 P.2d 809 (1989). '%e sole question is whether the losing party's position is so 
plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.;' Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 92, 803 P.2d 993, 998 (1991). 
The issue presented in the petition for review was not so plainly fallacious as to be 
determined frivolous or groundless. There is sparse case law dealing with the issue presented by 
Petitioner and the characterization of property as separate or community is generally controlled 
by the law of the state where property is acquired. The community property laws of Texas are 
similar in many ways to the laws of Idaho. However, there is a distinct difference in the manner 
of characterization of wages earned in Texas as compared to Idaho. This distinction. in large 
part, provided fowtdation for Petitioner's argument. It cannot be said that Petitioner's argument 
lacked foundation or was plainly fallacious. While Parker is on point with this Court's decision, 
in that case there was a stipulation as to what law applied, thus, the Parker Court did not address 
the precise issue addressed here. 
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The Court determines Petitioner's argument, while ultimately failing, was not devoid of 
merit. Therefore, Respondent's prayer for reasonable fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 
60-3049, 12-117, and 12-121 is denied. 
m. CONCLUSION 
Petitioner had a vested one-half interest in the wages earned by Mr. Dunn during the 
years in question. During that time Petitioner was domiciled in the State of Idaho. Petitioner is 
subject to personal income tax in her one-half interest in the wages earned by Mr. Dunn during 
the relevant years in Washington and Texas. The Commerce Clause is not implicated in the 
present case because Petitioner has failed to show how Idaho's taxation scheme of Petitioner's 
entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market. 
Further, Petitioner cannot show that Idaho's taxing scheme fails the internal consistency analysis. 
Petitioner,s argument was not frivolo~ groundless, or otherwise lacking a reasonable basis in 
factor law. 
For these reasons, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Com.mission's Final Decision and Order is AFFIRMED. 
DA TED this ny of June, 2016. 
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IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-15-3329 
REMITTITUR 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(t)(2) and (4), this matter is hereby remitted 
to the Idaho State Tax Commission. The Idaho State Tax Commission is hereby advised that this 
Court's decision, dated June 8, 2016, is final and the Commission is ordered to immediately 
comply with the directive of this Court's decision. 
DATED this ::21 ~; of July, 2016. 
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CASE NO. CV 2015-3329 
ORDER VACATING 
REMITTITUR 
An appeal having been filed on July 12, 2016; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Remittitur dated July 21, 2016, is vacated. 
Dated this :)/ S !;;. of July, 2016. 
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IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
CASE NO. CV-15-3329 
JUDGMENT 
The decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission is affirmed. 
DATED this 3~y of August, 2016. 
JUDGMENT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LINDA DUNN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
CASE NO. CV-15-3329 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
DOCUMENTS IN THE RECORD 
) 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) ______________ ) 
COMES NOW, Defendant, Idaho State Tax Commission, by and through its attorney of 
record, and, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28( c ), requests the following documents be added to 
the record (in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28): 
I. Statement oflssues (filed May 20, 2015); 
2. Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling (filed January 28, 2016); 
3. Joint Stipulation of Facts (filed February 22, 2016); 
4. Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief (filed March 29, 2016); 
5. Defendant's Opening Brief (filed April 1, 2016); 
6. Reply Brief of Appellant Linda Dunn (filed April 20, 2016); and 
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7. Defendant's Re~l~ Brief (filed April 22, 2016). 
DATED this 3 f day of August, 2016. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that no exhibits were submitted in 
this case. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai 
County, Idaho this 12th day of October, 2016. 
Jim Brannon 
Clerk of the District Court 
Debra D. Leu 
Deputy Clerk 
I -Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LINDA DUNN, individually and as 


















CASE NO. 44378 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the 
Attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY 
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309 
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83814 
DAVID B. YOUNG 
PO Box 36 
Boise, ID 83 722 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this 12th day of October, 2016. 
Jim Brannon 
Clerk of District Court 
By:_D_e_b_ra_D_. _Leu 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LINDA DUNN, individually and as 


















CASE NO. 44378 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the 
County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause was 
compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record was 
complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid on the 12th day of October, 2016 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County, 
Idaho this 12th day October, 2016. 
JIM BRANNON 
Clerk of the District Court 
Debra D. Leu By: ------------
Deputy Clerk 
